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Abstract
Financial markets and, in particular, the banking sector are recognized to be
a key driver of economies. The recent financial crisis of 2008 has highlighted
their important role and the need for regulation. This dissertation focuses on
studying the main features of financial markets and the banking sector. It
contains the following three chapters.
Self-Regulation and Stock Listing Decision of Banks. This chapter
develops a framework to model international banks’ assets trade. In particular,
we study the endogenous choice of self-regulation and stock listing decision
of banks among different financial markets. Investors consider banks’ self-
regulation as a measure of quality of stocks. First, we explore equilibrium
properties of prices and self-regulation in a closed economy. We show that banks
self-regulate as long as the cost of self-regulation is lower than its gain from
safeguarding the macroeconomic environment. In addition, results suggest that
the number of banks has a negative impact on banks’ decision to self-regulate.
Second, we analyze the equilibrium properties of prices, self-regulation and
endogenous stock listing decision in an open economy with two countries. We
show that the condition of self-regulation is the same as in the closed economy.
Moreover, when both countries have the same cost of self-regulation, the larger
region has an advantage of a larger demand. Therefore, all banks list their
stocks in the larger financial market. However, when self-regulation’ costs are
different, banks can decide to list their stocks in the smaller country.
An Empirical Investigation: Institutional Quality, Systemic Shock
and Dividends (joint with Chiara Peroni). The present research studies the
6impact of countries’ institutional quality on firms’ performance and on demand
for stocks. It also focuses on the effect of institutional quality on firms resilience
to systemic shocks. We, first, build a theoretical model where investors buy
stocks from the financial market and hold a portfolio of risky investment. We
assume that systemic shocks reduce dividends for all firms in the economy
and that high institutional quality reduces the negative impact of systemic
shocks on dividends. Thus, under our assumptions, we show that institutional
quality raises the demand for stocks. Second, we test the two key assumptions
of the theoretical model. Our findings show that the two main hypotheses are
verified and are robust to different specifications. Moreover, results suggest the
existence of a persistence in dividends payout. Therefore, firms that paid large
dividends in the previous year are more likely to distribute large dividends in
the current year.
Regulations and Rational Banking Bubbles in Infinite Horizon
(joint with Claire Océane Chevallier). This chapter develops a dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium model in infinite horizon with a regulated banking sector
where stochastic banking bubbles may arise endogenously. We analyze the con-
dition under which stochastic bubbles exist and their impact on macroeconomic
key variables. We show that when banks face capital requirements based on
Value-at-Risk, two different equilibria emerge and can coexist: the bubbleless
and the bubbly equilibria. Alternatively, under a regulatory framework where
capital requirements are based on credit risk only, as in Basel I, bubbles are
explosive and as a consequence cannot exist. The stochastic bubbly equilibrium
is characterized by positive or negative bubbles depending on the tightness of
capital requirements based on Value-at-Risk. We find a maximum value of
capital requirements under which bubbles are positive. Below this threshold,
the stochastic bubbly equilibrium provides larger welfare than the bubbleless
equilibrium. In particular, our results suggest that a change in banking policies
might lead to a crisis without external shocks.
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Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 has highlighted the importance of the
financial sector in the worldwide economy and its role in the propagation of the
economic crisis. This crisis was caused by valuation and liquidity problems in
the U.S banking system (Miao and Wang, 2015). Moreover, the globalization
of financial markets precipitated the fall of stock markets throughout the world.
As an illustration, on September 2008, Lehman Brothers experienced drastic
losses in its stock and was filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on 15th
September 2008.1 This crisis was not limited to the U.S banking sector, with
other sectors and other banks hit around the world. For example, the Dow Jones
index experienced its biggest daily fall on 29th September 2008, with a drop
of 6.98% of its value.2 In Europe, the Belgian bank Fortis encountered severe
problems in October 2008, and was repurchased partially by BNP Paribas.
These events raise awareness among both academics and policymakers of
the failure of financial market regulation, and banking regulation in particular.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was created in 1973 "to enhance
understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking
supervision worldwide".3 They released the first Basel Accord called "Basel
I" in 1988. Its purpose was to prevent international banks from growing
without adequate capital. Therefore, the committee imposes a minimum
1Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. was a global financial services firm founded in 1850.
2The Dow Jones Industrial Average is a stock market index which includes the 30
larger publicly owned companies based in the United States. For more details see
https://www.djindexes.com.
3For more details see The Basel Committee overview, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/.
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capital requirement which is calculated using credit risk weight of loans. The
idea is that banks holding riskier assets must hold more capital than other
banks to remain solvent. This approach has been criticized among researchers
and regulatory agencies because it only considers credit risk and does not take
market risk into account.4 Consequently, during "the pre-crisis period", the
Basel committee publishes the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II).5 This
new accord incorporates market risk of the trading book into the banking
regulation framework. It allows banks to use an internal model based on
Value-at-Risk to quantify their minimum capital requirement. Bernanke (2008),
Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and French et al. (2010) show that the regulatory
framework for banks prior the global financial crisis was defective. They argue
that it was focused on the financial conditions of individual institutions in
isolation and forgot to encompass consideration of systemic risks. They propose
an alternative regulatory approach called- "macroprudential". To follow this
approach, they suggest the development of tools that seek to safeguard the
financial system when a common shock hits banks. Therefore, Basel III requires
time-varying capital requirements for banks. The idea is that banks face higher
capital requirements in good periods, whereas the minimum requirement should
be less restrictive in bad periods.6
The present thesis investigates the regulation of the banking sector, the
effect of countries’ institutional quality on agent’s behavior and the emergence
of banking stock price bubbles.
The first chapter develops a framework to model international banks’ assets
trade. In particular, it studies the endogenous choice of self-regulation and
stock listing of banks among different financial markets. This approach allows
to study the implication of self-regulation on demand for stocks, stock prices
4For example, Dimson and Marsh (1995) analyze the relationship between economic risk
and capital requirements using trading book positions of UK securities firms. They find that
the Basel I approach leads only to modest correlation between capital requirements and total
risk.
5See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004). Implementation started from 2005.
6For more details see The Basel Committee Guidelines, July 2015.
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and stock listing of banks. We consider endogenous choice of self-regulation as
a quality decision for banks such as in competition models with quality choice
(Feenstra, 1994; Broda and Weinstein, 2006; Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011). Our
results suggest that banks self-regulate as long as the cost of self-regulation is
lower than its gain from safeguarding the macroeconomic environment. Martin
and Rey (2004) and Shleifer (1986), inter alia, suggest the existence of a
demand and size effect in international financial markets. In contrast, the main
purpose of this chapter is to understand the emergence of financial markets
in countries with a small number of investors. The analysis of this chapter
suggests that banks might list their stocks in the smallest financial market
when the cost of self-regulation is lower than that in the largest country. Such
a behavior is contingent on there being large enough comparative advantage in
macroprudence cost and on small trade costs. As a result, macroprudence cost
efficiency might modify the stock listing equilibrium and relaxes the advantage
of a larger demand.
The second chapter analyzes the impact of countries’ institutional quality
on firms’ performance and on demand for stocks. It also focuses on the effect
of institutional quality on firms resilience to systemic shocks. While it is
recognized that institutional quality are important to economic development,
empirical evidence is scarce. Acemoglu et al. (2005), in a review of the literature
on the relationship between institutional quality and growth, argue that good
institutions are a fundamental determinant of long-run growth. What is the
impact of institutional quality of countries on performance of firms and on
demand for stocks? Would greater institutional quality creates the emergence
of financial markets in small countries? Would the institutional quality enable
firms to become more resilient to systemic shocks? These research questions are
addressed theoretically and empirically in that chapter. We use the theoretical
model developed in Chapter 1 to model the market for stocks. This framework
assumes that better institutional quality reduces the negative impact of systemic
shocks on dividends. This implies that institutional quality increases the
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demand for stocks. An empirical model is developed and used to test the key
assumptions of the theoretical model. Empirical results confirm that, effectively,
the negative impact of a systemic shock on dividends is mitigated by a favorable
institutional setting.
The last chapter focuses on the emergence of stochastic bubbles in a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in infinite horizon, with the
purpose of providing arguments that could serve as a guidance for policy making.
The literature on the existence of bubbles in general equilibrium models with
infinitely lived agents is scarce, and is marked with few contributions. Tirole
(1982) shows that bubbles under rational expectations with infinitely lived agents
cannot exist since bubbles are explosive and cannot satisfy the transversality
condition. In contrast, Kocherlakota (1992) demonstrates that bubbles may
exist in general equilibrium models with borrowing or wealth constraints. The
main findings of this chapter suggest that under a capital requirement based on
Value-at-Risk, two different equilibria emerge and can coexist: the bubbleless
and the stochastic bubbly equilibria. The capital requirement based on Value-
at-Risk allows bubbles to exist. Conversely, under a regulatory framework
where capital requirement is based on credit risk (such as in Basel I), bubbles
are explosive and as a consequence cannot exist. Moreover, we find a maximum
value of capital requirements under which bubbles are positive. Below this
threshold, the stochastic bubbly equilibrium provides larger welfare than the
bubbleless equilibrium. In particular, our results suggest that a change in
banking policies might lead to a crisis without external shocks.
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Chapter 1
Self-Regulation and Stock
Listing Decision of Banks

Abstract
This chapter develops a framework to model international banks’ assets trade.
In particular, we study the endogenous choice of self-regulation of banks and
their stock listing decision among different financial markets. Investors consider
banks’ self-regulation as a measure of quality of stocks. First, we explore
equilibrium properties of prices and self-regulation in a closed economy. We
show that banks self-regulate as long as the cost of self-regulation is lower
than its gain from increasing the demand. In addition, results suggest that
the number of banks has a negative impact on banks’ decision to self-regulate.
Second, we analyze the equilibrium properties of prices, self-regulation and
endogenous stock listing decision in an open economy with two countries. We
show that the condition of self-regulation is the same as in the closed economy.
Moreover, when both countries have the same cost of self-regulation, the larger
region has an advantage of a larger demand. Therefore, all banks list their
stocks in the larger financial market. However, when self-regulation’ costs are
different, banks can decide to list their stocks in the smaller country.
Keywords: Endogenous quality, Self-regulation, Economic geography,
Banks, Financial markets, Macroprudential effort.
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1.1 Introduction
Since the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, there has been a stronger awareness
among both academics and policymakers of the failure of banking regulation.
Bernanke et al. (2008), Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and French et al. (2010)
show that the regulatory framework for banks prior the global financial crisis
was defective. They argue that it was focused on the financial conditions of
individual institutions in isolation and forgot to encompass consideration of
systemic risks. They propose an alternative regulatory approach which is called,
"macroprudential". To follow this approach, they suggest the development
of tools that seek to safeguard the financial system when a common shock
hits banks. Hanson et al. (2010) discuss different types of macroprudential
tools such as time-varying capital requirements and higher-quality capital.1
Furthermore, Ng and Rusticus (2011) also argue that reporting transparency is
also an important macroprudential tool. Indeed, they show that the lack of
transparency reporting of banks has amplified the financial crisis of 2007-2009
by reducing trust between the different economic agents.
The present chapter develops a framework to model international banks’
assets trade. We study the endogenous choice of self-regulation and stock
listing of banks among different financial markets. Banks self-regulate if they
exert effort applying macroprudential tools without any enforced regulation.
This approach allows us to study the implication of self-regulation on demand
for stocks, stock prices and stock listing of banks. In particular, this chapter
discusses the emergence of financial markets in countries with a small number
of investors.
1Time-varying capital requirements consist of banks maintaining higher ratios of capital
to-assets in good times than in bad times. Concerning, the higher-quality capital requirement,
the traditional capital metric for banks is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets
as defined by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. In this metric, capital includes
common and preferred stocks. However, common stocks are commonly recognized to be a
higher-quality form of capital than preferred. Indeed, in case of macroeconomic shock, they
are more friendly to the recapitalization process (Hanson et al., 2010).
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In this paper, we first build a model in a closed economy, where banks issue
stocks on the financial market with the aim of raising funds to finance internal
projects. Banks’ stocks are considered as horizontally differentiated products.
Banks simultaneously choose optimal stock prices and macroprudential effort
levels by maximizing their total amount of raised funds. Then, investors buy
stocks from the financial market and as a consequence, hold a portfolio of risky
investment. Indeed, the amount of dividends is uncertain. We use the same
shock structure as in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) where stocks demand is
determined endogenously. We consider macroprudential effort as a quality
decision for banks such as in competition models with quality choice (Feenstra,
1994; Broda and Weinstein, 2006; Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011). For horizontally
differentiated products, quality is represented by a demand shifter. The main
difference here is that a particular bank’s quality decision affects the demand
shifter for all banks’ stocks. This comes from the fact that self-regulation
impacts the macroeconomic environment by protecting the whole economy in
case of macroeconomic shock. This is consistent with the results of Asgharian
et al. (2014) who find that financial market quality has a significant effect on
trust, and that trust affects significantly stock market participation.
Secondly, we extend the closed economy model to an open economy model
with two countries and study the impact of macroprudential effort decision
on the stock listing decision of banks in international financial markets. In
the absence of quality, the economic geography literature with trade costs
predicts a concentration of banks in the country with greater domestic demand
(Krugman, 1991). However, the impact of quality choice on banks’ stock listing
decision is less clear in this literature.
Finally, we also analyze the first best and the second best optimum of a
social-maximizing regulator for both the closed and open economy model.
From the closed economy, we obtain the following results. We show that
each bank either decides to completely self-regulate or to not self regulate at
all. The decision of exerting macroprudential effort is the same for all banks.
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Banks’ self-regulation incentive decreases with a larger number of banks in the
economy. Indeed, macroprudential effort can be considered as a public good.
Therefore, an increase in the number of banks in the economy accentuates the
free-riding problem. We also show that macroprudential effort has a positive
effect on prices, demand for stock and, then on profits.
From the open economy model, our findings are summarized as follows.
First, macroprudential effort decision is independent of the proportion of
investors and number of banks in each country. It is only a function of the
total number of banks in the economy. Second, when both countries have the
same macroprudential effort cost, in the equilibrium, all banks locate in the
larger country. The smaller market is empty. This result is consistent with
the literature of economic geography (Krugman, 1991). Moreover, empirical
evidence shows that when a bank from a small country lists its stock in a larger
financial market, its stock price increases (Martin and Rey, 2004). In contrast,
when a country is more efficient in terms of the cost of exerting macroprudential
effort, it can relax the advantage of a larger demand. Indeed, even a smaller
country can attract banks if its cost advantage is large enough. Therefore,
this result may explain the existence of financial markets in small countries
(Luxembourg, Switzerland, etc,...). Hence, an important contribution of this
paper to the economic geography literature is the impact of quality on stock
listing equilibrium of banks. Quality can therefore modify the stock listing
equilibrium and diminish the larger demand advantage.
Finally, we examine the first best optimum for a social welfare maximizing
regulator in either a closed or open economy. The results are the same in both
cases. In contrast to banks’ decisions, the incentive to impose macroprudential
regulation increases with the number of banks in the economy.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the closed
economy model where stocks’ demand and supply are characterized. Section
3 analyzes the equilibrium properties of prices and self-regulation in a closed
economy. Section 4 presents the first best and second optimum of a welfare-
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maximizing regulator. Section 5 discusses the open economy and presents the
stock listing equilibrium. Section 6 analyzes optimal decision of an international
welfare-maximizing regulator. Finally, section 7 concludes.
1.2 Closed economy
In the baseline model, we consider one country where N ≥ 2 banks compete
in the financial market and investors choose among financial opportunities.
There are two periods, t = 0,1. In the initial period (period 0), banks issue
stocks on the financial market with the aim of raising funds to finance internal
projects. Then, investors buy stocks from the financial market. In the second
period (period 1), banks pay dividends (return) to investors. The amount of
dividend is uncertain, this is due to negative shocks between period 0 and
1. Two alternative negative shocks can occur: either a macroeconomic or an
idiosyncratic shock. The macroeconomic shock impacts negatively all bank
dividends in the same proportion, while the idiosyncratic shock reduces the
dividend of only one particular bank. To reduce the negative impact of the
macroeconomic shock, banks can exert macroprudential effort. Macroprudential
effort is a set of tools that seek to safeguard the financial system when a common
shock hits banks (Hanson et al., 2010). The intuition is that increasing the
quality of the financial market leads investors to trust the financial market
more, and thus increase demand.
The timeline of the game is as follows. In the first stage, banks maximize the
amount of funds raised by choosing simultaneously prices and macroprudential
effort. In the second stage, investors buy stocks issued by banks by maximizing
their expected utility. The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium, which is solved by backward induction. Thus, first, we analyze
the investor problem and second, the bank problem. Figure 1.1 summarizes
the timing.
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Figure 1.1 Timeline of the model
1.2.1 Demand side
Investors
We consider identical investors who live for two periods. In the first period,
each investor receives the same individual income w. He invests in the financial
market by buying a quantity qk of each stock issued by banks k, k ∈ {1, ...N} at
a price pk and consume x0. In the second period, he retires, receives dividends
Dk and consumes x1. Thus, in the second period, the investor’s portfolio has a
value of x1 =
∑N
k=1Dkqk.
We assume that all investors have identical preferences represented by the
following quadratic utility function (Markowitz, 1952; Tobin, 1958):
U = x0+x1(1− rx1),
where U is the utility function, x0 and x1 are, respectively, the consumption in
period 0 and 1. The coefficient r captures the risk aversion. Therefore, given
the budget constraint, each investor chooses the portfolio of shares {qk}k=1,...,N
that maximizes his expected utility:
Max
{x0,x1,qk}k=1,...,N
EU = x0+E [x1 (1− rx1)] , (1.1)
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subject to
x1 =
N∑
k=1
Dkqk, (1.2)
N∑
k=1
pkqk+x0 = w. (1.3)
For simplicity, the coefficient of risk aversion r is normalized to 12 . Equation
(1.3) represents the budget constraint. Without loss of generality, the price of
the first period good and the discount rate between time periods are normalized
to one. We assume that the wage is large enough for investors to purchase
all stocks qk > 0. In order to solve the investor problem, dividends should be
explicitly defined. For exposition purposes, the next subsection focuses on the
analysis of dividends.
Dividends
We assume that dividends are independent and identically distributed random
variables (i.i.d). The shock structure on dividends is defined as in Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (1997). For simplicity, banks pay a unit dividend in the absence
of shocks. As mentioned above, there are two alternative types of shock:
idiosyncratic shocks and a macroeconomic (correlated) shock. The idiosyncratic
shock only impacts a particular bank, while the macroeconomic shock impacts
all banks identically. There are N +1 states of nature. In state of nature
ω = 0, the shock on dividends is a negative macroeconomic shock. In this
case, all banks simultaneously pay the same dividend Dk = 1−γ to investors
where γ ∈ (0,1]. State ω = 0 takes place with probability φ. In state of nature
ω = k,k ∈ {1, ..,N}, an idiosyncratic shock occurs for bank k. All banks pay the
maximum dividend except bank k = ω, which pays a lower dividend Dk = 1−β,
β ∈ (0,1]. The probability of each idiosyncratic shock is equal to ψ. Finally,
probabilities add up to one such that φ+Nψ = 1. This excludes a state of
nature in which no shocks happen.
The consumption in period 1 is summarized as follows:
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x1 =

Q(1−γ) at prob(ω = 0) = φ,
Q−βqk at prob(ω = k, k∈ {1, ..,N} )= ψ.
(1.4)
Stock demand
We are now able to solve the investor’s problem. Replacing (1.4) in the
maximization problem given by (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3), we get
Max
{qk}k=1,...,N
EU =x0+φ(1−γ)Q[1− 12(1−γ)Q]+
N∑
k=1
ψ(Q−βqk)
[
1− 12(Q−βqk)
]
,
(1.5)
subject to
N∑
k=1
pkqk+x0 = w. (1.6)
Assuming qk > 0 for all k, the first order condition of the maximization problem
described by (1.5) and (1.6) with respect to qk is:
φ(1−γ)[1− (1−γ)Q]−ψQ(N −2β)+ψ(N −β)−β2qkψ−pk = 0. (1.7)
In Appendix A, we show that the second order condition for a maximum is
verified. Aggregating over all stocks yields:
Nφ(1−γ)[1− (1−γ)Q]−ψQ(N−2β)N−β2Qψ+ψ(N−β)N−P = 0. (1.8)
where P =∑Nk=1 pk is a price index. Solving (1.8) with respect to Q gives:
Q= Nφ(1−γ)+ψ(N −β)N −P
Nφ(1−γ)2+ψ(N −β)2 . (1.9)
Finally, plugging (1.9) in (1.7) and solving for qk yields:
qk = α− bpk+χP, (1.10)
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where
α≡ [(1−γ)φ+(N −β)ψ][Nφ(1−γ)2+ψ(N −β)2] ,
b≡ 1
β2ψ
,
and
χ≡ (1−γ)
2φ+ψ(N −2β)
[(1−γ)2Nφ+(N −β)2ψ]β2ψ.
Equation (1.10) is the typical demand function found for horizontal product
differentiation (Singh and Vives, 1984; Belleflamme et al., 2000; Ottaviano
et al., 2002). Parameter α measures the demand shifter for each stock. It can
be written as:
α = E(dk|ω = 0, ...,N)
N
(1−φ)V ar(dk|ω = 0)+ 1(1−ψ)V ar(dk|ω = 1, ...,N)
.
The demand shifter α increases with the expected return of dividends (numera-
tor) and falls with a larger variance of dividends in the case of the idiosyncratic
or the macroeconomic shock (denominator is proportional to the variance).
Parameter b measures the price sensitivity of stocks. The coefficient β is the
stochastic element which impacts negatively the dividend of a particular bank.
Thus, β2ψ is proportional to the variance of the stochastic element of dividends.
It increases the price sensitivity of stocks, meaning that investors pay less for
more uncertain returns. The parameter χ measures the degree of substitutabil-
ity. In particular, when χ→ 0 stocks are perfectly differentiated, while they
become perfect substitutes when χ→∞. Note that when N →∞, χ is equal
to 0.
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1.2.2 Supply side
We consider an oligopoly with N banks who compete to raise funds by issuing
stocks in the primary financial market.2 In the first period, each bank k issues
a quantity qk of stocks at price pk, k ∈ {1, ...,N}. In the second period, bank k
pays dividends to investors. Since dividends are uncertain and independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d), stocks are differentiated products, as in Martin
and Rey (2004). We assume that the amplitude of the macroeconomic shock
can be reduced by the banking sector’s macroprudential effort E such that
γ = 1−ηE,
where η is a macroprudential effort efficiency parameter. In what follows, we
focus on the case in which the amplitude of the macroeconomic shock is high
and close to one. We can write the Taylor expansion of the demand parameters
about γ = 1 as:
α≃ a+dE,
χ≃ c,
where
a= 1
N −β , d=
ηφ
ψ(N −β)2 and c=
(N −2β)
(N −β)2ψβ2 . (1.11)
are the values of α,dα/dγ and χ at γ = 1. Note that db/dγ = d2b/dγ2 = ...= 0
and dχ/dγ = 0 at γ = 1. As a result, the demand function is equal to
qk = a− bpk+ cP +dE. (1.12)
2Note that if we consider monopolistic competition, price index and the sector’s prudential
effort are given. Then, there is no incentive for bank k to exert prudential effort (free-rider
problem).
1.2 Closed economy 31
We assume that each bank k may contribute to the total macroprudential
effort by an individual macroprudential effortek. We consider diminishing
return in effort such that ek ∈ [0, e0] where e0 is the individual macroprudential
effort upper bound. Indeed, above e0, bank’s macroprudential effort does not
reduce the amplitude of the macroeconomic shock. The banking sector’s total
macroprudential effort is then given by ∑Nk=1 ek. Thus, E ∈ [0,Ne0]. In the
above approximation, one can see that macroprudential effort neither impacts
the price sensitivity nor the substitution effect. The parameter a is the demand
shifter for stock k when sector’s macroprudential effort and prices are nil.
It decreases with high number of banks. The parameter d represents the
demand sensitivity to macroprudence. It increases with the probability of a
macroeconomic shock φ and the macroprudential effort efficiency η. In contrast,
it decreases with the probability of idiosyncratic shock and the number of
banks.
Each bank k faces two different costs. First, a same marginal cost n on
internal projects. This cost may occur when banks invest in new branches, for
example. Second, a macroprudence cost which increases with macroprudential
effort. For example, it can represent the cost of bank’s reporting. It increases
with the number of issued shares. We define macroprudence cost for bank k as
mek where m is the macroprudence marginal cost of bank k. Using the optimal
demand from (1.12), the profit of bank k is:
πk = (pk−n−mek)(a− bpk+ cP +dE).
Under oligopolistic competition, each bank takes prices and macroprudential
effort of others banks as given and chooses simultaneously its best stock share
price and macroprudential effort. The equilibrium is defined such that bank
k ∈N maximizes its profit from issuing stocks:
Max
pk≥0,ek∈[0,e0]
πk = (pk−n−mek)(a− bpk+ cP +dE), (1.13)
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where E = ek+
∑
k′ ̸=k e∗k′ , P = pk+
∑
k′ ̸=k p∗k′ and where e∗k′ and p∗k′ are taken
as given.
1.3 Price and self-regulation equilibrium
In this section, we discuss equilibrium prices and macroprudential effort chosen
by banks.
For convenience, we define m(b− c) as the self regulation loss of each bank. It
is a function of macroprudence marginal cost m, price sensitivity b and degree
of substitution c. In Appendix B, we show that b > c.
In Appendix C, we solve for the maximization problem described by (1.13).
Since the problem is convex in ek, we find two different equilibria: one with
self-regulation e∗ = e0 and
p∗ = a+de0N +(n+me0)(b− c)2b− c−Nc ,
the other with no self-regulation, e∗ = 0 and
p∗ = a+n(b− c)2b− c−Nc.
The first takes place if d≥m(b− c) and the second otherwise.3 This condition
is equivalent to
m
η
≤ φ
[
β2
(N −β)2− (N −2β)
]
. (1.14)
Proposition 1. If condition (1.14) holds the banking sector self-regulates.
Otherwise, it prefers to not exert self-regulation. This condition is less likely to
hold for a larger number of banks.
Figure 1.2 shows that each bank k self-regulates when its profit given (q∗1,p∗1)
is higher than its profit with (q∗0,p∗0). This is verified when condition (1.14)
holds.
3Note that results are robust in the absence of the Taylor approximation.
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Figure 1.2 Effect of self-regulation on equilibrium
Banks’ self-regulation decision can be seen as a quality decision as in
models of competition with quality (Feenstra, 1994; Broda and Weinstein, 2006;
Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011). Thus, bank k increases self-regulation as long as
the cost of self-regulation is lower than the gain from increasing the demand.
The left-hand side of (1.14) is the self-regulation cost over efficiency and the
right-hand side represents the self-regulation gain. Condition (1.14) shows that
the number of banks N has a negative impact on banks’ decision to self-regulate.
The intuition is that macroprudential effort can be seen as a public good, thus,
a larger number of banks amplifies the free ride problem. Indeed, when a
particular bank increases its quality by exerting more macroprudential effort,
all banks demand shifter are positively impacted. In contrast, the incentive to
self-regulate increases with macroprudential effort efficiency on macroeconomic
shock η and macroeconomic shock’s probability φ. From condition d≥m(b−c),
one can see that large demand sensitivity to macroprudence d and large degree
of substitution c increase the incentive to self-regulate for banks. The intuition
of this latter effect is that a high degree of substitution raises demand and
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thus, reduces the self-regulation loss. In opposite, price sensitivity b reduces
self-regulation. Indeed, for stocks with high price sensitivity, increasing the
price by self-regulating reduces the demand.
In the self-regulation equilibrium (e∗ = e0), equilibrium prices rise with
demand sensitivity to macroprudence d and self-regulation loss m(b− c). This
implies that macroprudence is partially paid by investors. Equilibrium quanti-
ties and profits are:
q∗ =
[
a+dNe0− (n+me0)(b−Nc)
2b− c−Nc
]
(b− c),
and
π∗ =
[
a+dNe0− (n+me0)(b−Nc)
2b− c−Nc
]2
(b− c).
Since d ≥m(b− c) and Nd > m(b− cN), the endogenous choice of effort
impacts positively equilibrium quantities q∗ and profits π∗. The first condition
presented above comes from the individual self-regulation decision of banks,
while the second results from the aggregate self-regulation decision. In Appendix
C, we show that profits under self-regulation are positive.
In the no self-regulation equilibrium (e∗ = 0), equilibrium prices increase
with demand shifter a, substitution effect c and high number of banks N . In
contrast, they decrease with price sensitivity b. Equilibrium quantities and
profits are:
q∗ =
[
a−n(b−Nc)
2b− c−Nc
]
(b− c) and π∗ =
[
a−n(b−Nc)
2b− c−Nc
]2
(b− c). (1.15)
1.4 Regulator’s maximization problem
In this section, we investigate the case of a welfare-maximizing regulator. Social
welfare W is represented by the sum of banks’ profits Π and investors surplus
IS:
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W =Π+ IS.
Combining (1.5), (1.6), (1.7) and (1.12) investors surplus IS is given by
IS =
N∑
k=1
(a− bpk+ cP +dE)2
[
ψ
2 (N −β)
2
]
. (1.16)
We distinguish two different cases. The first best optimum where the regulator
sets optimal macroprudential effort and prices and the second best where the
regulator sets only optimal macroprudential effort, and then banks choose their
optimal prices.
1.4.1 First best optimum
In the first best optimum, the regulator maximizes social welfare by choosing
the optimal effort ek and price pk of bank k.
The regulator problem is defined by
Max
pk≥0,ek∈[0,e0]
W =Π+ IS.
Solving for the maximization problem described by (1.16), the first best
optimum gives us two different solutions where prices are equal to marginal
cost. The first with regulation eFB = e0 and
pFB = n+me0,
the second without regulation, eFB = 0 and
pFB = n.
Note that the price with no self-regulation is equal to the marginal cost on
banks’ internal projects n.
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The first takes place if dN ≥m(b−Nc) and the second otherwise. This
condition is equivalent to
m
η
≤ φN. (1.17)
The regulator imposes a regulation when the cost of regulation is lower
than the gain of mitigating macroeconomic shock losses. Compared to the
self-regulation equilibrium, the condition under which the regulator enforces
regulation is satisfied for a larger set of economic parameter. The incentive to
enforce banking regulation increases with a higher number of banks. Indeed, a
large number of banks increases the gain from the regulation. The idiosyncratic
shock β has no impact on the regulator’s first best optimum.
Proposition 2. If condition (1.17) holds, the regulator’s first best optimum
is to regulate. Compared to the self-regulation equilibrium, condition (1.17)
is less difficult to satisfy and the gain from imposing macroprudential effort
increases with a large number of banks.
1.4.2 Second best optimum
The second best optimum is characterized as follows. First, the regulator, as for
example the Basel Committee or the European Banking Authority, maximizes
social welfare by choosing the optimal macroprudential effort ek. Then, banks
set optimal prices pk. The second best problem can be solved by backward
induction.
The bank problem is defined as follows
Max
pk≥0
πk = (pk−n−meSBk )(a− bpk+ cP +dESB),
where P = pk+
∑
k′ ̸=k pSBk′ and where eSBk , ESB and pSBk′ are taken as given.
Solving the bank problem gives us the optimal price of bank k:
pSBk =
a+deSBN +(n+meSB)(b− c)
2b− c−Nc .
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The regulator problem is defined by
Max
ek∈[0,e0]
W =Π+ IS.
The regulator optimization problem yields to two solutions: one with regulation
eSB = e0 and the other with no regulation, eSB = 0. The regulator imposes
regulation on banks for d≥m (b−Nc)[1+(b−Nc)(b−c)] . This condition is equivalent to
m
η
≤ φN
[
1+ (N −β)
2− (N −2β)
(N −β)4ψ2β2
]
. (1.18)
Compared to the self-regulation equilibrium and the first best optimum,
the condition under which the regulator enforces regulation is less difficult to
satisfy. Moreover, the number of banks has a relatively higher positive impact
on the incentive to enforce banking regulation than in the first best. Intuitively,
optimum quantities and profits are an increasing function of the regulation.
Thus, the condition to impose self-regulation is even less restrictive than in the
first best optimum.
Proposition 3. If condition (1.18) holds, the regulator imposes a regulation.
Compared to the self-regulation equilibrium and the first best optimum, con-
dition (1.18) is less difficult to satisfy. The number of banks has even more a
positive impact on the incentive to enforce banking regulation than in the first
best optimum.
1.5 Open economy
In this section, we extend our baseline model by allowing banks to choose
where to list their stocks among two financial markets in country i and j.
In equilibrium, Ni and Nj are the sets of banks in financial market i and
j, with Ni+Nj = N, where N is the total number of banks in the economy.
A proportion θi (resp. θj) of investors are in country i (resp. j), so that
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θi+ θj = 1. Investors are immobile, and choose among domestic and foreign
financial opportunities.
Compared to the baseline model, there is a pre-stage game where banks
choose their best stock listing. The rest of the game does not change. As in
the baseline model, in the first stage, banks compete by issuing stocks with
the aim of raising funds. Then, investors buy stocks from domestic and foreign
financial markets. Note that the macroeconomic shock impacts all banks in
both countries by an equivalent amount. Figure 1.3 summarizes the timing of
the open economy model.
Figure 1.3 Timeline of the open economy model
1.5.1 Demand side
In the open economy, each investor buys an amount of all domestic and foreign
stocks to protect his investments against shocks (gain from diversification).
In addition to the price, an investor faces an inter-market transaction cost t
per-stock for buying foreign stocks. This cost captures banking commission and
variable fees, exchange rate transaction costs and possibly information costs.
For example, Adjaouté (2000) shows that cross-border financial transactions
inside Europe cost 10-20 times more than domestic ones: from 1 to 5 euros
for domestic transactions as opposed to 10 to 50 euros for cross-border trades
between European markets. Similarly, a study of the European Central Bank
(1999) estimates that fees charged to customers for cross-border transactions
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inside the euro-area vary between 3.5 to 26 euros for small amounts and between
31 and 400 euros for higher amounts. This results from the fact that cross-
border payments and securities settlements are more expensive and complicated
than domestic ones. Hence, demand for stock of bank k ∈ Ni becomes:
qk = θiqki+ θjqkj , (1.19)
where qki is stock demand for bank k by investors in i (home investors) and
qkj is stock demand for bank k by investors in j (foreign investors) where k ∈
Ni, j ̸= i. Equation (1.19) can be rewritten as follows.
qk = θi(a− bpk+ cPi+dE)+ θj(a− b(pk+ t)+ cPj+dE).
The inter-market cost is denoted t, and it is assumed to be low enough to allow
stock purchase from any market (qki > 0, qkj > 0). Price indices in each country
are given by Pi and Pj , j ̸= i, while E =∑k∈Ni ek+∑k∈Nj ek is the global
macroprudential effort. We define Pi≡∑k∈Ni pk+∑k∈Nj (pk+t) =P +tNj , j ̸=
i. The global price index is defined as P =∑k∈Ni pk+∑k∈Nj pk. Note that we
assume the bank k ∈ Ni sells its stock at the same price in both countries. It
does not discriminate in prices. As in (1.12), the parameter a measures the
demand shifter for stocks, b is the price sensitivity of stocks, c is the degree
of substitution and d is the demand sensitivity to macroprudence. Values of
these parameters are the same as in section 1.2.2.
Home bias
From the stock demand for bank k, k ∈ Ni, by investors in i and j, we observe
the existence of a home bias according to which home investors demand more
domestic rather than foreign stocks (Kenneth R. French, 1991; Cooper and
Kaplanis, 1994).4 The home bias for country i, for a given price pk, is given
4This is also referred as a financial home market effect (Helpman and Krugman, 1985).
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by:5
qki− qkj = bt+ c(Pi−Pj)
= t [b+ c(Nj−Ni)] .
We show in Appendix E that Pi−Pj = t(Nj−Ni). For a symmetric distribution
of banks (Nj =Ni), home bias corresponds to transaction cost t times price
sensitivity. For an asymmetric distribution of banks, the demand for stock
of bank k by investors in i diminishes if the price index Pi falls. For a large
number of banks Ni in i, competition is more intensive, which provides a lower
price index and lower home bias. This discussion can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 4. Comparable size stock markets are characterized by a home
bias, which falls with market integration, i.e lower inter-market cost, and with
the difference in the number of banks listed on each stock market.
1.5.2 Supply side
As in the closed economy, we consider an oligopoly where N =Ni+Nj banks
compete to raise funds by issuing stocks in both financial markets (i and j).
Banks also face a macroprudential cost. We assume that all banks in the same
country have the same macroprudence marginal cost. We define macroprudence
cost for bank k, k ∈ Ni as miek where mi is the macroprudence marginal cost
of bank k in i. Note that the marginal cost on internal projects n are the same
for all banks in both countries. Under oligopolistic competition, bank k, k ∈
Ni takes prices and macroprudential effort of others as given and chooses its
best share price pk and its macroprudential effort ek simultaneously. Using
(1.19), profit of bank k, k ∈ Ni is given by:
πk = (pk−n−miek)[θi(a− bpk+ cPi+dE)+ θj(a− b(pk+ t)+ cPj+dE)].
5See Appendix D for computation details.
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where πk is the profit of the bank k listed in i. The equilibrium is defined
such that bank k ∈Ni maximizes its profit from raising funds in the primary
financial market.
Max
pk≥0,ek∈[0,e0]
πk =(pk−n−miek)[θi(a−bpk+cPi+dE)+θj(a−b(pk+t)+cPj+dE)],
(1.20)
where
E = ek+
∑
k′ ̸=k,k′∈Ni
e∗k′+
∑
k∈Nj
e∗k,
Pi = pk+
∑
k′ ̸=k,k′∈Ni
p∗k′+
∑
k∈Nj
(p∗k+ t),
and
Pj = (pk+ t)+
∑
k′ ̸=k,k′∈Ni
(p∗k′+ t)+
∑
k∈Nj
p∗k,
while e∗k′ , p∗k′ for k′ ∈ Ni are taken as given as well as e∗k and p∗k, for k ∈ Nj .
1.5.3 Price and self-regulation equilibrium (second stage)
In this section, we discuss equilibrium prices and macroprudential effort chosen
by banks in both countries.
Define respectively mi(b− c) and mj(b− c) as the self-regulation loss of banks
in i (for all k ∈ Ni) and j (for all k ∈Nj).
Solving for the maximization problem described by (1.20), we find four
different equilibria: the first with global self-regulation e∗k = e0 for k ∈ {Ni,Nj}
and
p∗k =
a+de0N
2b− c−Nc +
(n+mie0)(b− c)− θjbt
2b− c (1.21)
+
c(b− c)
[
nN + e0(miNi+mjNj)+ t(θiNj+ θjNi)
]
(2b− c)(2b− c−Nc) , (1.22)
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for k ∈Ni. The second with no self-regulation, e∗k = 0 for k ∈ {Ni,Nj} and
p∗k =
a
2b− c−Nc +
n(b− c)− θjbt
2b− c +
c(b− c)[nN + t(θiNj+ θjNi)]
(2b− c)(2b− c−Nc) , (1.23)
for k ∈Ni. The third with partial self-regulation e∗k = e0 for k ∈Ni, e∗k = 0 for
k ∈Nj and
p∗k =
a+de0Ni
2b− c−Nc+
(n+mie0)(b− c)− θjbt
2b− c +
c(b− c)
[
nN + e0miNi+ t(θiNj+ θjNi)
]
(2b− c)(2b− c−Nc) ,
(1.24)
for k ∈ Ni. Note that the fourth equilibrium is symmetric to the partial self-
regulation configuration with e∗k = 0 for k ∈Ni and e∗k = e0 for k ∈Nj .
For convenience, we define
m= φβ
2η
(N −β)2− (N −2β) ,
as the maximum macroprudence cost under which banks self-regulate. The
first equilibrium takes place if d≥mi(b− c) and d≥mj(b− c) and the second
otherwise. These conditions are equivalent to
mi and mj ≤m. (1.25)
The third occurs if d≥mi(b− c) and d <mj(b− c) which is equivalent to
mi ≤m<mj . (1.26)
Figure 1.4 summarizes the different possible self-regulation equilibria.
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Figure 1.4 Self-regulation equilibria
Proposition 5. If condition (1.25) holds the global banking sector self-regulates.
Otherwise, it prefers to not exert self-regulation. If condition (1.26) holds, only
the banking sector in country i self-regulates.
The proof of proposition 5 is presented in Appendix F.
Proposition 5 shows that self-regulation is an optimal choice for banks in
each country when demand sensitivity to macroprudence d is high. In contrast,
self regulation in each country decreases with large self-regulation loss mi(b−c)
and mj(b− c). Note that conditions (1.25) and (1.26) for each country is the
same as in the closed economy model.
Concerning equilibrium prices, we define θiNj + θjNi as the index of co-
agglomeration. It decreases when banks and investors co-agglomerate in the
same market. Therefore, co-agglomeration of banks and investors in the same
market decreases stock prices (Picard, 2015).
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1.5.4 Stock listing equilibrium
In this section, we analyze the properties of the different stock listing equilibria.
A stock listing equilibrium is such that banks list their stocks in the most
profitable market. Define µik = 1 if bank k lists its stocks in country i.
Definition 1. Given µj∗l , l ̸= k, if πik > πjk then, µik = 1 and µjk = 0 for i ̸= j. If
πik = π
j
k, then bank k has the same probability equal to 1/2 to list its stocks in
country i or j . Note that πik is given by (1.20) with prices (1.22), (1.23), (1.24)
depending on the self-regulation equilibrium.
We, first, consider the case where macroprudence marginal costs are the
same in both countries. Second, we analyze the case where banks in one country
are more efficient in terms of costs to exert macroprudence.
Same macroprudence marginal costs: mi =mj =m
Suppose similar macroprudence marginal costs for every bank k ∈ {Ni,Nj}.
Only two different equilibria are possible: one with global self-regulation and
the other with no self-regulation (diagonal line in Figure 1.4).
Proposition 6. The stock listing equilibrium is at corner points Ni =N when
θi > θj , and Ni = 0 when θj > θi. Stock prices are larger in the larger market.
All banks list their stocks in the largest stock market. The smallest stock
market is empty. The banking sector self-regulates if the macroprudence cost
m in the larger market is lower than m.
Proof of Proposition 6 is presented in Appendix G. In presence of trade cost
t, all banks list themselves in the market with the larger amount of investors.
There is no dispersion force (crowding out) as in economic geography models
(Krugman, 1991), even if banks are competing with each others. Proposi-
tion 6 supports the theory of concentration of stocks in large market places.
This contrasts with analysis in Pagano (1989) whose discussion hinges on the
agglomeration force resulting from market liquidity.
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Different macroprudence marginal costs: mi <mj
Suppose that exerting macroprudential effort is less costly for banks in i such
that mi <mj . For example, banks in i have better knowledge and technologies
such that self-regulation is less costly for them compared to banks in country
j . Three equilibria are possible: one with global self-regulation, the second
with no self-regulation and the last with partial self-regulation. Since the
equilibrium with no self-regulation gives same results with same or different
macroprudence marginal costs, we focus on the analysis of the equilibria with
global self-regulation and partial self-regulation with mi < mj . We analyze
those equilibria for θi ≥ θj and θi < θj .
Proposition 7. If mi <mj and mi and mj ≤m.
1. For θi ≥ θj . All banks list their stocks in the larger market and self-
regulate.
2. For θi < θj and (θi− θj)t > mi−mj , all banks list their stocks in the
smaller market and self-regulate. In contrast, for (θi− θj)t < mi−mj ,
banks list their stocks in the larger market and self-regulate.
Proof of Proposition 7: Define e∗k ≡ ei∗ and q∗k ≡ qi∗, for k ∈ Ni, while
e∗k ≡ ej∗ and q∗k ≡ qj∗, for k ∈ Nj . Under global self-regulation (ei∗ = ej∗ = e0),
optimal stock demand of banks listed in country i is:
qi∗ =

1
2b−c−Nc [a+dNe0]+
c(b−c)[nN+miNi+mjNj+t(θiNj+θjNi)]
(2b−c)(2b−c−Nc)
−b (n+mie0+θjt)2b−c
(b− c).
(1.27)
qi∗− qj∗ = (θi− θj)t+(mj−mi).
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We show that demand qi∗ is larger than qj∗ at equilibrium, if and only
if (θi− θj)t+(mj−mi)> 0. This condition can hold for a low proportion of
investors in i, θi < θj , when the difference in macroprudence cost efficiency is
large enough, mi−mj . In this case, macroprudence cost efficiency relaxes the
advantage of a larger demand. This is consistent with Pieretti et al. (2007)
and Han et al. (2013), who argue that small sized countries can attract firms if
they regulate more efficiently. Note that this is more likely to occur for small
trade costs t. This result explains the existence of financial markets in small
countries such as in Luxembourg, Switzerland, inter-alia. Hence, an important
contribution of this paper to the economic geography literature is the impact
of quality on stock listing equilibrium of banks. Quality can therefore modify
the stock listing equilibrium and relax the advantage of a larger demand.
Proposition 8. If mi <mj and mi ≤m<mj .
1. Suppose θi ≥ θj . For t(θi− θj) > mi, all banks list their stocks in the
larger market i and self-regulate. In contrast, for t(θi− θj) < mi, all
banks list their stocks in the smaller market j and do not self-regulate.
2. Suppose θi < θj , such that t(θi− θj)<mi. All banks list their stocks in
the larger market j and do not self-regulate.
Proof of Proposition 8: Under partial self-regulation (ei∗ = e0 and ej∗ = 0),
the optimal stock demand of banks listed in country i is:
qi∗ =

1
2b−c−Nc(a+dNie0)+
c(b−c)[t(θiNj+θjNi)+miNi+nN ]
(2b−c)(2b−c−Nc)
−b (n+mie0+θjt)2b−c
(b− c).
qi∗− qj∗ = t(θi− θj)−mi.
Therefore, qi∗ > qj∗ if and only if t(θi−θj)>mi. This condition states that the
difference in proportion of investors times the transaction cost is higher than
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the macroprudence marginal cost. It holds only for large values of θi. When
this condition holds, all banks list their stocks in i. Therefore, since Ni =N ,
the partial self-regulation becomes the global self-regulation equilibrium. In
contrast, when t(θi− θj)<mi, the partial self-regulation becomes the no self-
regulation equilibrium. At equivalent proportion of investors in both countries
(θi = θj), the no-self regulation dominates.
1.6 International regulator’s maximization
In this section, we investigate the case of an international welfare-maximizing
regulator. Global social welfare is represented by the sum of banks’ profits in i
and j (Πi and Πj) and investors surplus for investors in both countries IS.
W=Πi+Πj+ IS.
We show the first best and the second best optimum. In the first best, the
international regulator sets optimal stock listing, macroprudential effort and
prices. In the second best, banks chooses their stock listing location. Then, the
Basel committee maximizes social welfare by choosing the optimal effort, and
finally banks set their prices by maximizing their profits.
First best optimum
In the first stage, the regulator decides the optimal stock listing and in the
second stage, it maximizes social welfare by choosing the optimal effort ek
and price pk for bank k ∈ {Ni,Nj}. Note that we assume the same marginal
macroprudence cost for banks in both countries m. Solving by backward
induction, the second stage regulator problem is defined as
Max
pk≥0,ek∈[0,e0]
W=Πi+Πj+ IS. (1.28)
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Solving for the maximization problem described by (1.28), the first best
optimum gives us two different equilibria, with prices equal to marginal cost.
The first with regulation eFB = e0 and
pFBk = n+me0,
the second without regulation, eFBk = 0 and
pFBk = n.
Note that the price with no self-regulation is equal to the marginal cost on
internal projects n.
The first takes place if d ≥ mN (b−Nc) and the second otherwise. This
condition is equivalent to
m
η
≤ φN. (1.29)
This condition is the same as in the first best condition in the closed economy
(1.17). This comes from the fact that banks face the same macroprudence cost,
thus the regulator enforces a regulation under the same condition for both
countries. For the regulator, the number of banks increases the incentive to
enforce banking regulation.
It can be shown that the regulator decides to locate banks in the country
with the larger number of investors. Thus, the number of investors who faces
transactions costs is minimized and profits of firms is maximized.
Second best optimum
In the first stage, banks chooses their stock listing. In the second stage, the
Basel committee maximizes social welfare by choosing the optimal effort, and
finally banks set their prices by maximizing their profits.
Solving by backward induction, the bank k ∈ Ni problem is defined as
follows
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Max
pk≥0,ek∈[0,e0]
πk =(pk−n−mieSBk )[θi(a−bpk+cPi+dESB)+θj(a−b(pk+t)+cPj+dESB)],
where
Pi = pk+
∑
k′ ̸=k,k′∈Ni
pSBk′ +
∑
k∈Nj
(pSBk + t),
and
Pj = (pk+ t)+
∑
k′ ̸=k,k′∈Ni
(pSBk′ + t)+
∑
k∈Nj
pSBk ,
while eSBk , pSBk′ for k′ ∈ Ni are taken as given as well as eSBk and pSBk , for k
∈Nj . Solving for the bank problem gives us the optimal price of bank k ∈Ni,:
pSBk =
a+deSBk N
2b− c−Nc+
(n+meSBk )(b− c)− θjbt
2b− c +
c(b− c)
[
nN + eSBk N + t(θiNj+ θjNi)
]
(2b− c)(2b− c−Nc) .
The Basel committee problem is defined by
Max
pk≥0,ek∈[0,e0]
W=Πi+Πj+ IS,
for bank k ∈ {Ni,Nj}. The regulator optimization problem yields to two
equilibria: one with regulation eSBk = e0 and the other with no regulation,
eSBk = 0. The regulator imposes regulation on banks for d≥m (b−Nc)[1+(b−Nc)(b−c)] .
This condition is equivalent to
m
η
≤ φN
[
1+ (N −β)
2− (N −2β)
(N −β)4ψ2β2
]
.
Here, again the condition for regulation is the same as in the closed economy.
It can be shown that banks list their stocks in the larger country.
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1.7 Concluding remarks
The present paper studies the effect of macroprudential effort on stock prices
and the stock listing of banks. In this model investors increase their demand
for all stocks when banks exert macroprudential effort. Banks self-regulate
as long as the cost of self-regulation is lower than its gain from safeguarding
the macroeconomic. The self-regulation’s gain increases with the probability
of macroeconomic shock and the self regulation efficiency. In contrast, self-
regulation incentive decreases with a large number of banks in the economy.
Since macroprudential effort is considered as a public good, this is consistent
with the free-riding problem. Self-regulation has a positive impact on prices,
demand and profits for all banks. In the open economy model, we show
that in the absence of self-regulation, all banks list themselves in the larger
market. This result also holds for the equilibrium with self-regulation when
both countries have the same marginal costs. However, introducing different
macroprudence costs allows us to relax the advantage of a larger demand.
Therefore, small sized countries with lower macroprudence cost can attract
banks and be the stock listing equilibrium. We also show that a social welfare
maximizing regulator enforces macroprudential regulation when the number of
banks in the economy is large. This result contrasts with the bank decision.
Therefore an important policy implication can be detected here, for a large
number of banks in the economy, banks do not self-regulate. Thus, the regulator
has to enforce macroprudential regulation to improve social welfare.
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1.9 Appendix
Appendix A
We prove that the second order condition of problem (1.5) for a maximum is
verified.
The second order condition of (1.5) with respect to qk is:
− [φ(1−γ)2+ψ(N −2β)+β2ψ]< 0. (1.30)
Since N ≥ 2,β ∈ (0,1] and γ ∈ (0,1], (1.30) is always verified.
Appendix B
We show that b > c,∀β,ψ,φ and N ≥ 2.
From (1.11), b > c implies:
(N −1)(N −2β)+β2 > 0. (1.31)
Since N ≥ 2, (1.31) is always positive.
Appendix C
This appendix presents the solution of the maximization problem described by
(1.13). The equilibrium is defined such that bank k ∈N maximizes its profit
by issuing stock:
Max
pk≥0,ek∈[0,e0]
πk = (pk−n−mek)qk,
where the demand is given by qk = a+d(ek+
∑
k′ ̸=k e∗k′)−bpk+c(pk+
∑
k′ ̸=k p∗k′)
while e∗k′ and p∗k′ are taken as given. The marginal profits from a price increase
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is given by
∂πk
∂pk
= qk− (pk−n−mek)(b− c). (1.32)
Note that ∂πk/∂pk is a decreasing function of pk, which is positive when
pk = n+mek and negative for pk→∞. So, the price pk lies between (n+mek)
and∞ and is given by the unique interior solution of ∂πk/∂pk = 0. From (1.32),
we have
qk = (pk−n−mek)(b− c). (1.33)
Since b > c, demand for stock is positive qk > 0 if pk > mek, which we have
assumed.
A marginal increase in effort yields
∂πk
∂ek
=−mqk+(pk−n−mek)d.
By (1.33), this is equal to
∂πk
∂ek
= (pk−n−mek) [d−m(b− c)] .
Under positive demand, this implies ∂πk∂ek Q 0 if and only if d−m(b− c) Q 0.
This condition is the same for all banks k = 1, ...,N whatever the price. Thus,
optimal macroprudential effort is the same for all banks:
e∗k ≡ e∗ =

0 if d <m(b− c),
e0 if d≥m(b− c).
This decision is the same for all banks k = 1, ...,N whatever the price. Plugging
it into (1.33) gives
(pk−n−me∗)(b− c)− (a+dNe∗− bpk) = cP,
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for all k = 1, ...,N . Therefore, p∗k ≡ p∗ and the previous identity gives
p∗ = a+dNe
∗+(n+me∗)(b− c)
2b− c−Nc .
The demand can be computed as
q∗k ≡ q∗ =
[
a+dNe∗− (n+me∗)(b−Nc)
2b− c−Nc
]
(b− c). (1.34)
The profit of bank k is
π∗k ≡ π∗,
= (p∗−n−me∗)2(b− c),
=
[
a+dNe∗− (n+me∗)(b−Nc)
2b− c−Nc
]2
(b− c)> 0.
We finally prove that demands q∗ are positive at the equilibrium. This will
imply that equilibrium profits are also positive. Indeed, on the one hand, the
denominator of equation (1.34) is equivalent to 2b > c(N +1). This inequality
simplifies to
ψ
[
(N −1)(N −2β)+2β2
]
> 0.
which is always verified for N ≥ 2. On the other hand, the numerator of
equation (1.15) is positive when d <m(b−c) and therefore e∗ = 0 because a > 0.
It is also positive when d >m(b− c) and therefore e∗ = e0.
Appendix D
The home bias is given by qiki− qikj = bt+ c(Pi−Pj). Since,
qiki = a− bpik+ cPi+dE.
qikj = a− b(pik+ t)+ cPj+dE.
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Thus, the home bias is given by
qiki− qikj = a− bpik+ cPi+dE−a+ b(pik+ t)− cPj−dE = bt+ c(Pi−Pj).
Appendix E
We show that Pi−Pj = t(Nj−Ni). Price indices are defined as follows:
Pi ≡
Ni∑
k=1
pik+
Nj∑
k=1
(pjk+ t).
Pj ≡
Ni∑
k=1
pjk+
Nj∑
k=1
(pik+ t), j ̸= i.
Thus, we write Pi−Pj as follows.
Pi−Pj =
Ni∑
k=1
pik+
Nj∑
k=1
(pjk+ t)−
Ni∑
k=1
pjk−
Nj∑
k=1
(pik+ t) = t(Nj−Ni).
Appendix F
We, here, prove Proposition 5. The equilibrium is defined such that bank k ∈Ni
maximizes its profit from issuing stock:
Max
pk≥0,ek∈[0,e0]
πk = (pk−n−miek)qk,
where the demand is given by qk = θi(a+dE− bpik+ cPi)+ θj(a+dE− b(pik+
t)+ cPj) while e∗k′ and p∗k′ for k ∈ Ni and e∗k and p∗k for k ∈ Nj are taken as
given. The marginal profits for bank k ∈Ni from a price increase is given by
∂πk
∂pk
= qk− (pk−n−miek)(b− c). (1.35)
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Note that ∂πk/∂pk is a decreasing function of pk, which is positive when
pk = n+miek and negative for pk→∞. So, the price pk lies between (n+miek)
and∞ and is given by the unique interior solution of ∂πk/∂pk = 0. From (1.32),
we have
qk = (pk−n−miek)(b− c).
Since b > c, demand for stock is positive qk > 0 if pk > mek, which we have
assumed.
A marginal increase in effort yields
∂πk
∂ek
=−miqk+(pk−n−miek)d.
By (1.35), this is equal to
∂πk
∂ek
=
(
pk−n−miek
)[
d−mi (b− c)
]
.
Under positive demand, this implies ∂πk∂ek Q 0 if and only if d−mi (b− c) Q 0.
This condition is the same for all banks k ∈ Ni whatever the price. Define
e∗k ≡ ei∗ and q∗k ≡ qi∗,k ∈ Ni, while e∗k ≡ ej∗ and q∗k ≡ qj∗,k ∈ Nj . Thus, optimal
macroprudential effort is the same for all banks k ∈Ni :
e∗k ≡ ei∗

0 if d <mi(b− c),
e0 if d≥mi(b− c).
This decision is the same for all banks k ∈Ni whatever the price. Plugging it
into (1.35) gives
(pk−n−miei∗)(b− c)−
[
a+d
(
Nie
i∗+Njej∗
)
− θjbt
]
= c(θiPi+ θjPj),
1.9 Appendix 59
for all k ∈Ni. Therefore, p∗k ≡ pi∗,k ∈Ni and since θiPi+θjPj = cP + t(θiNj+
θjNi), the previous identity gives
pi∗=(n+miei∗)(b− c)2b− c +
1
2b− c
[
a+d
(
Nie
i∗+Njej∗
)
− θjbt+ cP + ct(θiNj+ θjNi)
]
.
Aggregating those prices we get:
P = Nipi∗+Njpj∗
= (b− c)2b− c
(
nN +miNiei∗+mjNjej∗
)
+ N2b− c
[
a+d
(
Nie
i∗+Njej∗
)]
+ Nc2b− c [P + t(θiNj+ θjNi)]−
bt
2b− c(θiNj+ θjNi).
Solving for the fixed point yields:
P = (b− c)2b− c−Nc
(
nN +miNiei∗+mjNjej∗
)
+ N2b− c−Nc
[
a+d
(
Nie
i∗+Njej∗
)]
−t (b−Nc)2b− c−Nc(θiNj+ θjNi).
The equilibrium stock prices for k ∈Ni is given by
pi∗ = 12b− c−Nc
[
a+d
(
Nie
i∗+Njej∗
)]
+ (n+m
iei∗)(b− c)− θjbt
2b− c
+c (b− c)(2b− c)(2b− c−Nc) [nN +m
iNie
i∗+mjNjej∗+ t(θiNj+ θjNi)].
The demand for banks k ∈Ni can be computed as
qi∗ = 12b− c−Nc
[
a+d
(
Nie
i∗+Njej∗
)]
− b(n+m
iei∗+ θjt)
2b− c
+c (b− c)(2b− c)(2b− c−Nc) [nN +m
iNie
i∗+mjNjej∗+ t(θiNj+ θjNi)](b− c).
and optimal profits for all k ∈Ni
πi∗ =
 12b−c−Nc
[
a+d
(
Nie
i∗+Njej∗
)]
− b(n+miei∗+θjt)2b−c
+c (b−c)(2b−c)(2b−c−Nc) [nN +m
iNie
i∗+mjNjej∗+ t(θiNj+ θjNi)]

2
(b− c).
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Appendix G
Appendix G proves Proposition 6.
Define e∗k ≡ ei∗ and q∗k ≡ qi∗ for k ∈ Ni, while e∗k ≡ ej∗ and q∗k ≡ qj∗, for
k ∈ Nj . With global self-regulation (ei∗ = ej∗ = e0), we show that demands
qi∗ is larger than qj∗ at equilibrium, if and only if θi > θj . This implies that
equilibrium profits are larger in country i. Optimal stocks demand of banks
listed in country i is: :
qi∗ =

1
2b−c−Nc (a+dNe0)+
c(b−c)[t(θiNj+θjNi)+miNe0+nN ]
(2b−c)(2b−c−Nc)
− b(n+mie0+θjt)2b−c
(b− c).
Then, qi∗− qj∗ is given by
qi∗− qj∗ = θi− θj .
Therefore, only the difference in investors proportion affects the stock listing
equilibrium. At no self-regulation equilibrium, stocks demand for banks in i is
written as
qi∗ =
[
a
(2b− c−Nc) +
ct(θiNj+ θjNi)(b− c)
(2b− c)(2b− c−Nc) −
b(n+ θjt)
2b− c
]
(b− c).
qi∗− qj∗ = bt2b− c [θi− θj ].
Therefore, qi∗ > qj∗, and as a consequence πi∗ > πj∗ if and only if θi > θj .
Chapter 2
An Empirical Investigation:
Institutional Quality, Systemic
Shock and Dividends
(joint with Chiara Peroni)

Abstract
The present research studies the impact of countries’ institutional quality on
firms’ performance and on demand for stocks. It also focuses on the effect of
institutional quality on firms resilience to systemic shocks. We, first, build a
theoretical model where investors buy stocks from the financial market and
hold a portfolio of risky investment. We assume that systemic shocks reduce
dividends for all firms in the economy and that high institutional quality
reduces the negative impact of systemic shocks on dividends. Thus, under
our assumptions, we show that institutional quality raises the demand for
stocks. Second, we test the two key assumptions of the theoretical model. Our
findings show that the two main hypotheses are verified and are robust to
different specifications. Moreover, results suggest the existence of a persistence
in dividends payout. Therefore, firms that paid large dividends in the previous
year are more likely to distribute large dividends in the current year.
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2.1 Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 affected all countries, those with good
and bad macroeconomic fundamentals. However, the extent of output losses
differed widely across countries (Giannone et al., 2011). The global nature of
the financial crisis and the heterogeneity of countries institutional quality gives
an opportunity to identify key factors related to firms’ and countries’ resilience
to systemic shocks. Institutional quality is recognized to impact the economic
performance of firms, and this is because the quality of institutional framework
shapes the business environment. In countries with high quality of institutional
frameworks, firms and investors enjoy better auditing, more efficient judicial
systems and greater enforcement of property rights. Besley (1995) and Johnson
et al. (2002) state that strong enforcement of property rights attract more
investment. Asgharian et al. (2014) analyze stock market participation in a large
sample of European data on households in fourteen European countries with
variable levels of institutional quality. They find that institutional quality has a
significant effect on trust, and that trust, particularly the part that is explained
by institutional quality, affects significantly stock market participation. The
authors argue that if people trust that financial contracts are being enforced,
and that the cost of fraudulent behavior is sufficiently high, there is presumably
a higher propensity to invest. In addition, Pieretti et al. (2007) and Han
et al. (2013) suggest that institutional quality allows small countries to attract
firms. Thus, the role of institutional quality might offer an explanation of
why countries with a small number of investors develop in prominent financial
centers.
This research contributes to this literature analyzing the impact of countries’
institutional quality on the performance of firms and on the demand for stocks.
It also studies the effect of institutional quality on firms’ resilience to systemic
shocks. The main idea is to provide evidence on the role of institutional quality
on the developing of financial center.
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This chapter is divided into two parts. Firstly, we use the theoretical model
developed in Chapter 1 of the present thesis to model the market for stocks.
Following the study of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), the model allows two
types of shock to affect dividends: a systemic shock which reduces dividends for
all firms, and an idiosyncratic shock that only reduces dividends of a particular
firm. The model assumes that the negative impact of a systemic shock on
dividends is mitigated by a favorable institutional setting. The model’s solution
delivers a typical demand function under horizontal product differentiation
(Singh and Vives, 1984; Belleflamme et al., 2000; Ottaviano et al., 2002). Results
imply that increasing institutional quality raises the demand for stocks, by
reducing the loss in dividends when a systemic shock occurs. This is consistent
with the results of Asgharian et al. (2014) who find that institutional quality
has a significant effect on trust and that trust, in turn, determines significantly
stocks market participation.
Secondly, it analyzes empirically the relationship between institutional
quality, systemic shocks and dividends payout. The aim of the analysis is
to estimate the effect of markets’ institutional quality on dividends payout
by firms since the theoretical model predicts that this variable affects the
demand for stocks. An empirical model is developed and used to test the key
assumptions of the theoretical model. These are as follows: 1) a systemic shock
reduces dividends for all firms in the economy; 2) high institutional quality
reduces the negative impact of a systemic shock on dividends. The model is
estimated using data on balance sheets and income statements of EU listed
companies sourced from the COMPUSTAT database, as well as indicators of
institutional quality available at country level. Namely, institutional quality
is measured by two different indicators as in Giannone et al. (2011). These
are, respectively, the World Bank’s Regulatory Quality index and the Economic
Freedom index released by the Fraser Institute. The sample ranges from 2004 to
2011, which allows us to study different economic environments. We run different
regressions. First, we split countries into high and low institutional quality
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categories. Results suggest that the negative effect on dividends stemming
from a systemic shock is mitigated by institutional quality, which supports our
two main hypotheses. We run several robustness checks. Our hypotheses are
also verified when the institutional quality indexes are specified as continuous
variables instead of dummies. Additional results suggest the existence of a
persistence in dividends payout, which is consistent with previous findings
(Lintner, 1956). Firms that paid larger dividends in the previous year are
more likely to distribute large dividends in the current year. We show that our
hypotheses are still verified with this specification.
This research contributes to the understanding of the relationship between
firms’ performance and institutional quality, showing that institutional quality
mitigates the negative effect on dividends of systemic shock. While it is
recognized that institutions are important to economic development, empirical
evidence is scarce. Acemoglu et al. (2005), in a review of the literature on
the relationship between institutional quality and growth, argue that good
institutions are a fundamental determinant of long-run growth. Several authors
and policy makers have discussed the resilience of countries to systemic shocks
(see, for example, Hellman et al., 1997; Beck et al., 2009; Giannone et al., 2011).
Some of these studies came to surprising conclusions. Giannone et al. (2011),
who study the difference in the degree of losses due to the 2008 financial crisis,
show that countries with high regulatory quality were less able to resist to
the financial crisis and experienced the greatest losses. This study differs with
Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Giannone et al. (2011) in that it analyzes the effect
of institutional quality on firms’ performance and resilience to systemic shocks
adopting a microeconomic perspective. Our results show that institutional
quality reduces the negative impact of a systemic shock on dividends payout
and as consequence on demand for stocks. So, we observe that countries
with highest institutional quality are not worse off. When in fact we look at
microdata, we see that results are different, at least for financial markets.
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This chapter also contributes to the economic literature which focuses on
the emergence of financial markets in small countries (Pieretti et al., 2007; Han
et al., 2013). This literature argues that small countries can attract firms by
providing a good institutional quality framework to investors.
The remaining of this chapter is as follows. The next section presents the
theoretical model. Section 3 describes the data and presents the empirical
model. Main results are analyzed in section 4. Discussion and additional results
are considered in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical model
In this section, we use the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 1 of the
present thesis to analyze the effect of institutional quality on dividends and
on demand for stock. Our model considers identical investors who live for two
periods. In the first period, each investor receives the same individual income
w. He invests in the financial market by buying a quantity qk of each stock
issued by firms k, k ∈ {1, ...N} at a price pk and consume x0. In the second
period, he retires, receives dividends Dk and consumes x1. Thus, in the second
period, the investor’s portfolio has a value of x1 =
∑N
k=1Dkqk.
We assume that all investors have identical preferences represented by the
following quadratic utility function (Markowitz, 1952; Tobin, 1958):
U = x0+x1(1− rx1),
where U is the utility function, x0 and x1 are, respectively, the consumption in
period 0 and 1. The coefficient r captures the risk aversion. Therefore, given
the budget constraint, each investor chooses the portfolio of shares {qk}k=1,...,N
that maximizes his expected utility:
Max
{x0,x1,qk}k=1,...,N
EU = x0+E [x1 (1− rx1)] , (2.2)
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subject to
x1 =
N∑
k=1
Dkqk, (2.3)
N∑
k=1
pkqk+x0 = w. (2.4)
For simplicity, the coefficient of risk aversion r is normalized to 12 . Equation
(2.4) represents the budget constraint. Without loss of generality, the price of
the first period good and the discount rate between time periods are normalized
to one. We assume that wages are large enough for investors to purchase all
stocks qk > 0. In order to solve the investor problem, dividends should be
explicitly defined. The next subsection focuses on the analysis of dividends.
Dividends
We assume that dividends are independent and identically distributed random
variables (i.i.d). The shock structure on dividends is defined as in Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (1997). For simplicity, firms pay a unit dividend in the absence
of shocks. As mentioned above, there are two alternative types of shock:
idiosyncratic (independent) shocks and a macroeconomic (correlated) shock.
The idiosyncratic shock only impacts a particular firm, while the macroeconomic
shock impacts all firms identically. There are N +1 states of nature. In state
of nature ω = 0, the shock on dividends is a negative macroeconomic shock. In
this case, all firms simultaneously pay the same dividend Dk = 1−γ to investors
where γ ∈ (0,1]. Here, we assume that systemic shocks reduce dividends for all
firms in the economy. This assumption will be the first hypothesis that we will
test in the empirical model of the present chapter, we call it assumption 1. State
ω = 0 takes place with probability φ. In state of nature ω = k,k ∈ {1, ..,N}, an
idiosyncratic shock occurs for firm k. All firms pay the maximum dividend
except firm k = ω, which pays a lower dividend Dk = 1−β, β ∈ (0,1]. The
probability of each idiosyncratic shock is equal to ψ. Finally, probabilities add
up to one: φ+Nψ = 1. This excludes a state of nature in which no shocks
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happen.
The consumption in period 1 is summarized as follows:
x1 =

Q(1−γ) at prob(ω = 0) = φ,
Q−βqk at prob(ω = k, k∈ {1, ..,N} )= ψ.
(2.5)
Stock demand
We are now able to solve the investor’s problem. Replacing (2.5) in the
maximization problem given by (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4), we get
Max
{qk}k=1,...,N
EU =x0+φ(1−γ)Q[1− 12(1−γ)Q]+
N∑
k=1
ψ(Q−βqk)
[
1− 12(Q−βqk)
]
,
(2.6)
subject to
N∑
k=1
pkqk+x0 = w. (2.7)
Assuming qk > 0 for all k, the first order condition of the maximization problem
described by (2.6) and (2.7) with respect to qk is:
φ(1−γ)[1− (1−γ)Q]−ψQ(N −2β)+ψ(N −β)−β2qkψ−pk = 0. (2.8)
In Appendix A, we show that the second order condition for a maximum is
verified.
Aggregating over all stocks yields:
Nφ(1−γ)[1− (1−γ)Q]−ψQ(N−2β)N−β2Qψ+ψ(N−β)N−P = 0. (2.9)
where P =∑Nk=1 pk is a price index. Solving (2.9) with respect to Q gives:
Q= Nφ(1−γ)+ψ(N −β)N −P
Nφ(1−γ)2+ψ(N −β)2 . (2.10)
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Finally, plugging (2.10) in (2.8) and solving for qk yields:
qk = α− bpk+χP, (2.11)
where
α≡ [(1−γ)φ+(N −β)ψ][Nφ(1−γ)2+ψ(N −β)2] ,
b≡ 1
β2ψ
,
and
χ≡ (1−γ)
2φ+ψ(N −2β)
[(1−γ)2Nφ+(N −β)2ψ]β2ψ.
Equation (2.11) is the typical demand function found for horizontal product
differentiation (Singh and Vives, 1984; Belleflamme et al., 2000; Ottaviano
et al., 2002). Parameter α measures the demand shifter for each stock. It can
be written as:
α = E(dk|ω = 0, ...,N)
N
(1−φ)V ar(dk|ω = 0)+ 1(1−ψ)V ar(dk|ω = 1, ...,N)
.
The demand shifter α increases with the expected return of dividends (numera-
tor) and falls with a larger variance of dividends in the case of the idiosyncratic
or the macroeconomic shock (denominator is proportional to the variance).
Parameter b measures the price sensitivity of stocks. β is the stochastic element
which impacts negatively the dividend of a particular firms. Thus, β2ψ is
proportional to the variance of the stochastic element of dividends. It increases
the price sensitivity of stocks, meaning that investors pay less for more un-
certain returns. The parameter χ measures the degree of substitution. In
particular, when χ→ 0 stocks are perfectly differentiated, while they become
perfect substitutes when χ→∞.
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We assume that the amplitude of the macroeconomic shock can be reduced
by increasing the institutional quality I such that
γ = 1−ηI,
where η > 0 is an institutional efficiency parameter and
d(1−γ)
dI = η.
This assumption will be the second hypothesis (assumption 2) that we will test
in the empirical model presented in section 2.3.
Under assumptions 1 and 2, the above framework allows us to analyze the
impact of institutional quality on the demand for stocks. In what follows, we
focus on the case in which the amplitude of the macroeconomic shock is high
and close to one. We can write the Taylor expansion of the demand parameters
around γ = 1 as:
α≃ a+dI,
χ≃ c,
where
a= 1
N −β , d=
ηφ
ψ(N −β)2 and c=
(N −2β)
(N −β)2ψβ2 .
are the values of α,dα/dγ and χ at γ = 1. Note that db/dγ = d2b/dγ2 = ...= 0
and dχ/dγ =0 at γ =1. Assuming symmetric firms k,k ∈{1, ..,N}, assumptions
1 and 2 give the following demand function:
qk = a+dI+pk(Nc− b),
where
dqk
dpk
= (Nc− b).
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The demand shifter α is an increasing function of dividends payout when a
systemic shock occurs (1−γ). Better institutional quality reduces the negative
impact of systemic shocks on dividends and as a consequence increase the
demand for stocks. Under assumptions 1 and 2, Figure 2.1 shows that, for a
given supply, the equilibrium price and quantity of stock k increases with the
rise of institutional quality from I0 to I1. Indeed, an increase of institutional
quality shifts the demand for stocks to the right. Therefore, firms have an
incentive to ask for improvement of institutional quality and/or to list their
stocks in a country with better institutional quality.
Figure 2.1 Effect of institutional quality on the demand for stocks
2.3 Empirical analysis
This section presents an empirical model to test the key assumptions of the
theoretical model discussed in the previous section, namely that first, systemic
shock reduces dividends for all firms in the economy (assumption 1), and second,
better institutional quality reduces the negative impact of a systemic shock on
dividends (assumption 2). The aim of testing those assumptions is to verify
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the impact of institutional quality on demand for stocks as predicted by the
implication of the theoretical model. Indeed, under assumptions 1 and 2, the
theoretical model implies that the equilibrium price and quantity of stock k
increases with the rise of institutional quality. Thus, firms have an incentive to
ask for improvement of institutional quality. Firstly, this section presents the
data used in the analysis, then outlines the empirical strategy.
2.3.1 Data and descriptive
The dataset used in this analysis includes annual observations on balance
sheets and income statements of EU listed companies, as well as indicators of
institutional quality constructed at country level. The sample ranges from 2004
to 2011, thus including the years of the financial crisis, which is interpreted
here as a systemic shock (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014; Bernanke et al.,
2008). The firm-level data are an unbalanced panel of 1906 firms sourced from
COMPUSTAT, a large database that contains information on firms’ balance
sheets and income statements. The total number of observations on firms is
9173 observations. Since we are interested in explaining changes in dividends,
we only include firms that pay dividends. The country level data are indicators
of institutional quality. We use the Regulatory Quality index released by the
World Bank and the Economic Freedom computed by the Fraser Institute as in
Giannone et al. (2011). To eliminate exchange rate risk, we consider companies
with headquarters in one of the following countries of the Euro-zone: Austria,
Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.1
The aim of this analysis is to estimate the effect of systemic shocks and
institutional quality on firms dividends payout, in order to verify assumptions
1 and 2. The implication of the theoretical model suggests that if those two
1COMPUSTAT includes 96% of companies listed in Europe. For our purpose, we consider
firms that are listed in the Euro-zone and in, particular, in one of the above 17 countries.
The number of firms in our dataset is 1906, which represents 50% of Euro-zone firms that
are included in COMPUSTAT. For example, 1300 companies are listed in Euronext.
74 An Empirical Investigation: Institutional Quality and Dividends
assumptions are verified, institutional quality has a positive effect on the
demand for stocks. Therefore, the dependent variable used in this analysis
is dividends payout. The main variables of interest are institutional quality
and systemic shock. We consider two proxies for the institutional quality: the
regulatory quality index and the economic freedom index. The regulatory
index represents an indicator of governance and “market friendliness”. This
index is computed by the World Bank, it is a measure of “the ability of the
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that
permit and promote private sector development” (Kaufmann et al., 2002). It is
based on surveys of firms and industries and on the assessment of commercial
risk rating agencies, non-governmental organizations and various multilateral
aid agencies and public sector organizations. For example, it includes price
liberalization, competition policies in various sectors, discriminatory taxes and
tariffs, trade and exchange rate controls, access to capital markets. Using the
above information, the World Bank attributes a score to countries according to
their level of regulatory quality, the score is between [-2.5, 2.5]. Countries that
have the lowest regulatory quality have the minimum grade of -2.5. In contrast,
countries that have the grade of 2.5 have the highest regulatory quality.
The economic Freedom of the World (EFW) is the second indicator of insti-
tutional quality. It measures the degree to which the policies and institutions of
countries are supportive of economic freedom. This index, released by the Fraser
Institute, is constructed measuring five areas, size of government (expenditures,
taxes, and enterprises), legal structure and security of property rights, access
to sound money, freedom to trade internationally, and regulation of credit,
labor, and business. In particular, for our research, we use the regulation index
(fifth area). This index has three sub-components: credit market regulation,
labor market regulation and business regulation. The credit market regulation
component considers ownership of banks as described by Barth et al. (2013).
The rating for this sub-component is computed using the percentage of bank
deposits held in privately owned bank. It also examines the private-sector credit
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which measures the extent of government borrowing relative to private-sector
borrowing and the level of interest rate controls. Labor market regulation
includes among others hiring and firing market regulation, centralized collective
bargaining and working-time regulations. Finally, business regulation uses for
example data on administrative requirements, bureaucracy costs and ease of
starting a business. Each country is rated between 0 to 10, where 10 is the
maximum. Note that the Regulatory Quality index is recognized to have a
broader scope than the Economic Freedom indicator (Giannone et al., 2011).
For our baseline empirical model, countries are divided in two categories
according to the level of regulatory quality and economic freedom. The high
regulatory quality category includes countries that have a minimum grade of
1.3/2.5 (sample average) for the regulatory quality index. Thus, the regulatory
quality variable takes the value of one if the firm is in a high regulatory
quality country and zero otherwise. The high economic freedom group contains
countries that have a minimum grade of 6.94/10 (sample average) for the
economic freedom index. Economic freedom variable takes the value of one if
the firm has its headquarters in a country with high economic freedom and
zero otherwise.
The systemic shock is a dummy variable that takes value 1 during the
period 2008-2009 and zero otherwise. This allows us to model two distinct
macroeconomic environments: the normal period and the crisis period. This
follows Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) and Bernanke et al. (2008), who
interpreted the Great Recession as a systemic shock. Figure 2.2, which presents
the GDP growth in the Euro area, shows that 2008 is characterized by a large
fall in GDP growth, only 0,5% of growth and that 2009 saw negative growth of
-4,5%.
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Figure 2.2 Annual GDP growth (%), Euro area
Source: World bank, annual GDP growth in percentage, Period 2004-2011.
We also control for several key financial characteristics of firms that are regarded
as determinants of dividends payout: size, profitability, growth, leverage, tax,
retained earnings and cash holdings. These variables have been identified and
described by Boldin and Leggett (1995), Fama and French (2001) and Jiraporn
et al. (2011). Those characteristics are computed using information from balance
sheets and income statements. Table 2.1 lists the different control variables and
summarizes their expected effect on dividends. The size is measured by the
total assets of firms. We expect that this variable impacts dividends positively.2
Profitability, growth, retained earnings, and cash are, respectively, measured
by net income over total sales, capital expenditures over total assets, retained
earnings over total equity and cash over total assets. These four variables are
expected to have a positive impact on dividends. Leverage is the total debt
over total assets, which represents the use of borrowed money to increase firms’
size. It is expected to have a negative impact on dividends. The intuition is
that firms with high levels of leverage earn lower profits since they pay a large
amount of interests to debt owners. As a consequence, they have less money
to distribute in dividends. Finally, tax is the income taxed paid by firms over
total assets. This last variable is also expected to have a negative impact on
dividends.
2Total assets is given by the sum of the asset side of the balance sheet.
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Table 2.1 Control variables
Control Variables Measurement Expected effect on dividends
Size Natural logarithm of total assets +
Profitability Net income over total sales +
Growth Capital expenditures over total assets +
Leverage Total debt over total assets -
Tax Income taxes over total assets -
Retained earnings Retained earnings over total equity +
Cash Cash over total assets +
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 present, respectively, summary statistics and correlations
for the selected variables. Table 2.2 allows comparisons across economic environ-
ment; the normal period and the crash period. The level of regulatory quality
and economic freedom indexes are pretty stable across both periods. To ensure
that the results are not driven by stock price, we compare dividends-to-total
asset ratio for each period as in Abreu and Gulamhussen (2013). Dividends
over total assets decreases from 3% in normal period to 2.8% during the crash
period. Note that dividends during the crash period are those resulting from
the activity in 2008-2009 and distributed in 2009-2010. The mean of dividends
is larger during the crash period than in normal period. This contrasts with the
key assumption of the theoretical model which predicts that dividends payment
is lower during the crash period. This can be due to a price effect. We also
suspect that this comes from the decrease in leverage during the crisis period.
Since summary statistics provide the average of dividends without controlling
for the effect of other variables, the decrease in leverage might positively affect
dividends in the crash period. The same result is observed for the mean of
profitability. However, the median of profitability is lower in the crash period
at 3% than in normal period with 4,7%. Moreover, growth has decreased from
5.2% for the normal period to 4.1% for the crash period. From Table 2.2, the
effect of the systemic shock on dividends is uncertain and unclear.
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Table 2.3 shows that dividends are positively correlated with total asset,
profitability, growth, tax, retained earnings, regulatory quality and economic
freedom. In contrast, dividends are negatively correlated with leverage, tax and
cash holdings. Except for the cash variable, the cross-correlation table confirms
the expected effect on dividends of the control variables as described by Table
2.1 and the main variable (institutional quality) as expected by the theoretical
model. Figure 2.3, which plots correlation between regulatory quality and
economic freedom, suggests that these two variables have a positive linear
relationship.
Figure 2.3 Correlation between Regulatory Quality and Economic Freedom
Source: World Bank (regulatory quality) and the Fraser Institute (Economic freedom).
2.3.2 The empirical model
The baseline empirical model is specified as follows:
ln(dividends payoutit) = αi+βXit+α8 shockt+α9 institutional qualityit
+α10 institutional qualityit* shockt+ uit,
where Xit is the vector of control variables which includes size, profitability,
growth, leverage, tax, retained earnings and cash holdings and β is the vector
of control variables’ coefficients. Firms are denoted by i= 0, ...,I and time by
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t= 0, ...Ti. The coefficient αi is a firm fixed effect and uit is the normal error
term of mean 0 and variance σ2. The explanatory variables of interest are
shock and institutional quality. Note that all firms in the same countries have
the same level of institutional quality. The parameter α8 estimates the direct
effect of the shock on dividends. To test the hypothesis that better institutional
quality reduces the negative impact of a systemic shock on dividends, we
include the interaction of the shock with the institutional quality. To simplify
the interpretation of marginal effects, without loss of generality, we consider
institutional quality as a dummy variable. Countries are divided into two
categories: high institutional quality and low institutional quality. Firms are
located in one of the two types of countries. Therefore, institutional quality is a
dummy variable which takes the value of zero when the firm has its headquarter
in a country with low institutional quality and the value of one otherwise.
Table 2.4 summarizes the empirical model for the different possible states
of nature (normal vs. crash) and for the different levels of institutional quality
(high vs. low). Recall the dependent variable yit = ln(dividends payoutit).
Table 2.4 Institutional quality
State of the economy
Normal (shock=0) Crash (shock=1)
Low yit =it +uit yit = βXit+α8+uit
High yit = βXit+α9+uit yit = βXit+α8+α9+α10+uit
Table 2.5 presents the percentage change in dividends from a period of
normality to a crash period for firms listed in countries with low and high
institutional quality. It also describes the percentage change in dividends for
firms that are in low institutional quality countries compared to firms that
are listed in high quality countries in both economic environment. Note that
the percentage changes in dividends are calculated assuming no change in the
model error.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show that going from a normal to a crash period modifies
dividends by α8 for firms in low institutional quality countries and by α8+α10
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Table 2.5 Marginal effects on dividends: shock and institutional quality
% change in dividends
Normal to crash, low institutional quality country 100[exp(α8)−1]
Normal to crash, high institutional quality country 100[exp(α8+α10)−1]
Low to high institutional quality, normal period 100[exp(α9)−1]
Low to high institutional quality, crash period 100[exp(α9+α10)−1]
for firms in high institutional quality countries. Therefore, since assumption 1
from theoretical model predicts that a systemic shock reduces dividends for
all firms in the economy, we expect that α8 < 0 and α8+α10 < 0. In addition,
this table shows that improving the regulatory quality for firms leads to a
change in dividends of α9 in a normal period and of α9+α10 in crash period.
Assumption 2 from the theoretical model suggests that better institutional
quality reduces the negative impact of systemic shocks on dividends. Therefore,
α9+α10 should be positive. Our three main testable hypotheses on parameters
are summarized as follows:
(H1) : α8 < 0
(H2) : α8+α10 < 0
(H3) : α9+α10 > 0
Hypotheses (H1) and (H2) verify assumption 1 of the theoretical model.
Finally, the hypothesis (H3) tests the theoretical assumption 2. Note that the
theoretical model makes no assumption on the impact of institutional quality
on dividends in normal period.
2.4 Results
Table 2.6 presents results from the estimation of the empirical model of dividends
related to institutional quality, as discussed in the previous section.3 Note that
3We have run our regressions using two different estimators of dividends payout; dividends-
over-total assets ratio and dividends in euros. Results are the same in both cases, except for
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the empirical results are valid conditional on the event that firms distribute
a positive dividend payout each period.4 Column (1) of Table 2.6 gives the
estimate of the baseline regression, where institutional quality is measured
by the regulatory quality dummy.5 Results show that the direct effect of the
systemic shock on dividends, captured by the parameter α8, is significant and
negative, which confirms (H1). In contrast, the coefficient of regulatory quality,
α9, is not significantly different from zero. A possible explanation is that it
is costly for firms to comply with countries institutional standards. Thus, in
normal period the positive effect of regulatory quality on dividends can be
canceled out by the cost. Finally, and most importantly, the interaction term
parameter, α10, is significant and positive. This parameter captures the effect
of regulatory quality on dividends when a systemic shock occurs.
One can also see that the larger the firms, the higher is the increase in
dividends. In particular, an increase of 1% of assets leads to an increase of
0.76% in dividends. Growth and retained earnings have also significant positive
impacts on dividends. The intuition is that firms which invest using capital
expenditures and retained earnings earn more profits and then distribute
more dividends. In contrast, by raising leverage by 1%, dividends fall by
1.71%. Indeed, firms with a high level of debt have lower profits because they
pay substantial interest, resulting in fewer resources available to distribute in
dividends. Profitability, tax and cash have no significant effect on dividends
growth. These reported results confirm outcomes found in previous literature
on the effects of controls variables on dividends (Boldin and Leggett, 1995;
Fama and French, 2001; Jiraporn et al., 2011).
The bottom rows of column (1) of Table 2.6 reports the results of the
F -tests for α8+α10 > 0 and α9+α10 < 0, which are, respectively, 11.50 (p-
the coefficient of total assets, which is normal. To facilitate the intuition, we have decided to
use the dividends in euros as the dependent variable.
4This assumption has reduced the sample by 921 firms over a total sample of 10024 firms
(≈ 9%).
545,44% of total observations are in the high regulatory quality group, and thus, 54,56%
of observations are in the low regulatory category.
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value=0.0007) and 11.07 (p-value=0.0003). The tests reject the null hypothesis.
Thenceforward, (H2) and (H3) are verified. Thus, assumption 1 and 2 are
confirmed by the first regression of Table 2.6.
To evaluate the goodness of fit of this regression, we use the R2 measure
which is equal to 0.69. This shows that the model fits the data.6
Table 2.6 Regulatory Quality and Economic Freedom (dummies)
(1) (2) (3)
ln(dividends) ln(dividends) ln(dividends)
ln(assets)(α1) .762∗∗∗ .768∗∗∗ .763∗∗∗
(.052) (.053) (.052)
Leverage (α2) -1.708∗∗∗ -1.758∗∗∗ -1.717∗∗∗
(.388) (.393) (.388)
Profitability (α3) .000 .000 .000
(.000) (.000) (.000)
Growth (α4) 2.231∗∗∗ 2.199∗∗∗ 2.197∗∗∗
(.426) (.425) (.426)
Tax (α5) .284 .359 .343
(.432) (.444) (.439)
Retained Earnings (α6) .068∗ .069∗ .068∗
(.039) (.040) (.039)
Cash (α7) .103 .107 .103
(.213) (.213) (.212)
Shock (α8) -.260∗∗∗ -.164∗∗∗ -.262∗∗∗
(.051) (.035) (.052)
Regulatory quality dummy (α9) .035 -.006
(.043) (.047)
Regulatory quality dummy*Shock (α10) .162∗∗∗ .219∗∗∗
(.056) (.061)
Economic freedom dummy (α11) -.038 -.031
(.037) (.037)
Economic freedom dummy*Shock (α12) -.018 -.137∗∗
(.054) (.058)
Fixed effect (αi) -2.763∗∗∗ -2.758∗∗∗ -2.733∗∗∗
(.327) (.330) (.327)
Tests of null hypothesis: F-test F-test F-test
α8+α10 > 0 11.50∗∗∗ 0.99
α9+α10 < 0 11.07∗∗∗ 15.47∗∗∗
α8+α12 > 0 18.30∗∗∗ 29.87∗∗∗
α11+α12 < 0 0.92 8.03∗∗∗
Observations 9173 9173 9173
R2 0.6867 0.6836 0.6843
Columns (1)-(3) report the outcome of three panel regressions with fixed effect. Heteroskedas-
ticity robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. Each coefficient is significant at 10%*,
5%** or 1%*** level. Units: Dividends and assets are in euros. Others variables are in
percentage. Sources: COMPUSTAT, World Bank and the Fraser Institute.
6see Appendix B for a graphical analysis of residuals.
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Table 2.7 summarizes the marginal effects of variables of interest from
the regression in column (1) of Table 2.6. A macroeconomic shock induces a
100[exp(α8+α10)−1] percentage change in dividends for firms that are listed
in high institutional quality countries, other things held equal and a percentage
change in dividends of 100[exp(α8)−1] for firms in low institutional quality
countries. Finally, a positive change in quality leads to a percentage change in
dividends of 100[exp(α9+α10)−1].
Table 2.7 Marginal effects on dividends: systemic shock and regulatory quality
% change in dividends
1. Normal to crash, low regulatory quality country 100[exp(α8)−1] =−22.89< 0
2. Normal to crash, high regulatory quality country 100[exp(α8+α10)−1] =−9.33< 0
3. Low to high regulatory quality, crash period 100[exp(α10)−1] = 17.58> 0
Results in Table 2.7 suggest that systemic shocks reduce dividends by
22.89% for firms based in countries with low regulatory quality, and only by
9.33% for firms in high regulatory quality countries. Moreover, during a crash
period, firms that are in high regulatory quality environment distribute 17.58%
more dividends than firms based in low regulatory quality countries.
Column (2) of Table 2.6 reports results of the baseline empirical model
using an alternative measure of institutional quality, that is, the economic
freedom index specified as a dummy variable.7 Results show that the effect of
the systemic shock and institutional quality are again, respectively significant
and negative and not significant, thus confirming results obtained with the
regulatory quality index. However, economic freedom has no impact on the
response of dividends to the systemic shock. The mitigating effect found
for the regulatory quality index is not present. A possible explanation is
that the two indicators capture different characteristics of the institutional
environment. Thus, in column (3) of Table 2.6, we include both regulatory
quality and economic freedom variables as well as their interactions with the
shock. Results show that the effect of the systemic shock and institutional
7 62,78% of observations are in the high economic freedom category, and thus, 37,22% of
observations are in the low economic freedom category.
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quality approximated by both regulatory quality and economic freedom are
again, respectively significant and negative and not significant, which confirms
results obtained with the specification of column (1) and column (2) of Table
2.6. Finally, and most importantly, the interaction term between shock and
regulatory quality parameter α10 is positive and significant. In contrast with
column (2) of Table 2.6, economic freedom has now a negative impact on
the response of dividends to the systemic shock. This confirms that the
regulatory quality and economic freedom do not capture the same institutional
environment. This result is consistent with Giannone et al. (2011) who argue
that regulatory quality index has a broader scope and as a consequence it
probably captures an important element of the institutional framework that is
not included in economic freedom.
The empirical analysis shows that the effect of regulatory quality does
not change across specifications, which suggests that the mitigating effect of
regulatory quality on systemic shocks impact on dividends is a robust result.
The way the dummies are specified might affect the results. The use of dummies
only captures a change from low to high institutional quality category. Thus,
in order to assess the effect of every small change of institutional quality on
dividends, we re-run the regressions of Table 2.6 using regulatory quality and
economic freedom modeled as continuous variables instead of dummies.8
8 We transform the original codification of regulatory quality index which ranges between
[-2.5,2.5] to a [0,10] range, from lowest to highest.
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Table 2.8 Regulatory Quality and Economic Freedom (continuous)
(1) (2) (3)
ln(dividends) ln(dividends) ln(dividends)
ln(assets)(α1) .795∗∗∗ .774∗∗∗ .801∗∗∗
(.053) (.053) (.053)
Leverage (α2) -1.518∗∗∗ -1.640∗∗∗ -1.484∗∗∗
(.371) (.376) (.365)
Profitability (α3) .000 .000 .000
(.000) (.000) (.000)
Capital Expenditures Ratio (α4) 2.042∗∗∗ 2.315∗∗∗ 2.104∗∗∗
(.407) (.432) (.411)
Tax Ratio (α5) .450 .176 .365
(.424) (.428) (.422)
Retained Earnings (α6) .063 .072∗ .065
(.040) (.040) (.040)
Cash Holdings (α7) .142 .126 .154
(.211) (.211) (.210)
shock (α8) -1.047∗∗ -2.044∗∗∗ -1.549∗∗∗
(.425) (.513) (.556)
Regulatory quality (α9) .588∗∗∗ .561∗∗∗
(.107) (.104)
Regulatory quality*shock (α10) .115∗∗ -.005
(.054) (.045)
Economic freedom (α11) .103∗ .067
(.061) (.057)
Economic freedom*shock (α12) .278∗∗∗ .209∗∗∗
(.073) (.070)
Fixed effect -7.434∗∗∗ -3.557∗∗∗ -7.740∗∗∗
(.940) (.595) (1.155)
Tests of null hypothesis: F-test F-test F-test
α9+α10 < 0 33.91∗∗∗ 28.73∗∗∗
α11+α12 < 0 14.18∗∗∗ 8.77∗∗∗
Observations 9159 9159 9159
R2 0.6933 0.6921 0.6955
Columns (1)-(3) report the outcome of three panel regressions with fixed effect. Heteroskedas-
ticity robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. Each coefficient is significant at 10%*,
5%** or 1%*** level. Units: Dividends and assets are in euros. Others variables are in
percentage. Sources: COMPUSTAT, World Bank and the Fraser Institute.
Column (1) of Table 2.8 presents results from the baseline regression, where
institutional quality is measured by the regulatory quality index specified as
continuous variable. Results show that the direct effect of the systemic shock
on dividends, captured by the parameter α8, is significant and negative, which
confirms (H1). In contrast with column (1) of Table 2.6, the coefficient of
regulatory quality α9 is, now, significant and positive. A possible explanation
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is that using the continuous regulatory quality allows the capture of the exact
effect of an increase of regulatory quality in a normal period. Indeed, it considers
not only a change from low to high regulatory quality as in Table 2.6 but every
small change. Finally, and most importantly, the interaction term parameter
α10 is significant and positive. This parameter captures the effect of regulatory
quality on dividends when a systemic shock occurs.
Column (2) of Table 2.8 repeats the same estimation using the Fraser
institute’s economic freedom index to proxy institutional quality. Results show
that the effect of the systemic shock and the economic freedom are, respectively
significant and negative (H1) and significant and positive. This latter effect of
economic freedom contrasts with the results obtained in Column (2) of Table
2.6. Moreover, the interaction term parameter is here significant and positive.
These results are consistent with column (1) of the present table.
In column (3) of Table 2.8, we include both regulatory quality and economic
freedom variables as well as their interactions with the shock. Results show
that the effect of the systemic shock and the regulatory quality are, respectively
significant and negative (H1) and significant and positive. However, the direct
effect of the economic freedom index is not significant. The interaction terms
parameters α10 and α12 are respectively not significant and significant and
positive. A possible explanation is that the regulatory quality index captures
the effect of institutional quality in a normal period. However, economic
freedom represents the institutional quality in a period of shock.
Since Table 2.8 uses continuous variables as indicators of institutional qual-
ity, the marginal effect of the systemic shock on dividends is given by
100[exp(α8+α10institutional quality)−1]. Thus, the change in dividends de-
pends on the level of institutional quality. Using conventional statistics test
developed for point estimates, only (H3) can be tested. The F -tests for
α9+α10 < 0 and α10+α12 < 0 are respectively 33.91 (p-value=0.0000) for
column (1) and 28.73 (p-value=0.0000) for column (2). Thus, assumption 2 is
verified for the various specifications.
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The goodness of fit of regressions in column (1), (2) and (3) of Table 2.8,
are evaluated using the R2 measure. The R2 measures reported in Table 2.8,
suggest that the different specifications fit the data well.
Table 2.9 measures the marginal effects of a change of regulatory quality
in both economic state for the columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 2.8. Results
given by Table 2.9 quantify the effect of institutional quality on dividends.
Table 2.9 Marginal effects on dividends: systemic shock, regulatory quality and
economic freedom
% change in dividends
Column(1)
Increase of 1% of regulatory quality, normal period 10α9 = 5.8
Increase of 1% of regulatory quality, crash period 10(α9+α10) = 7> 0
Column(2)
Increase of 1% of economic freedom, normal period 10α11 = 1.3
Increase of 1% of economic freedom, crash period 10(α11+α12) = 3.8> 0
Column(3)
Increase of 1% of regulatory quality, normal period & crash period 10α9 = 5.6> 0
Increase of 1% of economic freedom, crash period 10α12 = 2.09> 0
2.5 Discussion and additional results
This section focuses on the potential persistence of dividends. Lintner (1956)
analyzes the behavior of 28 US firms during the period of 1918-1941. He argues
that dividends are sticky around a target dividend level. Therefore, the Lintner
empirical model consists of a regression of current dividends against lagged
dividends and other control variables. The intuition is that firms that paid
large dividends in the previous year are more likely to distribute large dividends
in the subsequent year.
In order to identify the shock period in a dynamic model, we use the variable
"GDP Growth" which captures the GDP growth in the euro area during the
period of 2004 to 2011. Indeed, the use of this variable allows us to capture
every small changes in economic growth that have an impact on dividends.
Using a dummy to capture the shock in this model leads to less significant
effect of the macroeconomic environment on dividends. Note that the use of
90 An Empirical Investigation: Institutional Quality and Dividends
GDP growth in the baseline model gives the same results that those with the
shock dummy variable. The data on GDP Growth are sourced from Eurostat.9
The empirical model with persistence of dividends is specified as follows:
ln(Dividends payoutit) = αi+βXit+ δln(Dividends payoutit−1)
+α8 GDP growtht+α9 institutional qualityit
+α10 institutional qualityit*GDP growtht+ uit.
Firms are denoted by i= 0, ...,I and time by t= 0, ...Ti. The above regression
includes the lag of dividends. The parameter δ estimates the effect of past
dividends on current dividends. As in the baseline model, the vector Xit of
control variables includes size, profitability, growth, leverage, tax, retained
earnings and cash. The vector β contains coefficients of control variables. The
coefficient αi is a firm fixed effect and uit is the normal error term of mean
0 and variance σ2. Parameters α8 and α9 estimate, respectively, the direct
effect of GDP growth and institutional quality on dividends. In contrast to the
baseline model, α8 is now expected to be positive. Indeed, for positive value of
GDP growth, we expect that the effect on dividends is positive. Symmetrically,
negative value of GDP growth should impact negatively dividends. The param-
eter α10 is the coefficient of the interaction of GDP growth with institutional
quality. When α10 is negative, institutional quality has a positive effect on
dividends in shock periods (negative GDP).
Since the above regression includes the lag of dividends as an explanatory
variable of dividends, the strict exogeneity condition between the error term
and the regressors is ruled out. However, as argued by Keane and Runkle
(1992) and Wooldridge (2010), we can assume sequential exogeneity. Hsiao
(1986) shows that the fixed effect estimator is not consistent for dynamic panel
data under sequential exogeneity. Thus, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose
using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).
9http://ec.europa.eu/eurosta
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Table 2.10 presents results when the lag of dividends is included as an
explanatory variable of current dividends. Columns (1) and (2) consider,
respectively, regulatory quality and economic freedom as a proxy of institutional
quality.
Table 2.10 Regulatory Quality and Economic Freedom: dynamic
(1) (2)
ln(dividends) ln(dividends)
lag of ln(dividends) (δ) .380∗∗∗ .383∗∗∗
(.068) (.066)
ln(assets) (α1) .314∗∗∗ .298∗∗∗
(.066) (.066)
Leverage (α2) .339 .296
(.263) (.262)
Profitability (α3) .004∗∗∗ .004∗∗∗
(.001) (.001)
Growth (α4) ) 2.376∗∗∗ 2.387∗∗∗
(.431) (.431)
Tax Ratio (α5) -.459 -.506
(.664) (.664)
Retained Earnings (α6) .087∗∗∗ .087∗∗∗
(.023) (.023)
Cash (α7) -.662∗∗∗ -.658∗∗∗
(.250) (.250)
GDP Growth (α8) .030∗∗∗ .034∗∗∗
(.006) (.005)
Regulatory quality (α9) .156∗
(.091)
GDP Growth*regulatory quality(α10) -.004∗∗∗
(.001)
Economic freedom (α11) -.046
(.067)
GDP Growth*economic freedom (α12) -.004∗∗∗
(.001)
Fixed effect -1.939∗∗ -.328
(.814) (.675)
Observations 5132 5132
log(likelihood)
Columns (1)-(2) report the outcome of two panel regressions with fixed effect.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. Each coefficient is
significant at 10%*, 5%** or 1%*** level. Units: Dividends and assets are in euros.
Others variables are in percentage. Sources: COMPUSTAT, Eurostat, World Bank
and the Fraser Institute.
Results of column (1) in Table 2.10 show that the lag of dividends is
significant and positive. Thus, this suggests that there exits a persistence in
paying dividends. An increase of 1% of dividends in previous period raises
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current dividends by 0.38%. The direct effect of GDP growth captured by
α8 and the effect of regulatory quality α9 are both significant and positive
on dividends. The parameter α8 is consistent with the negative impact of
systemic shock assumption (H1). The interaction coefficient α10 is significant
and negative as expected. Concerning the control variables, Table 2.10 shows
that the size effect represented by the natural logarithm of assets on dividends
is reduced to half compared to Tables 2.6 and 2.8. This can be explained by
the fact that the lag of dividends captures a positive effect that was considered
as a size effect. Here, leverage has no significant effect any longer. Coefficients
of growth and retained earnings are similar to those in Tables 2.6 and 2.8. In
contrast, profitability and cash are now significant. The negative effect of cash
can be explained by the fact that when firms hold cash, they do not invest in
their assets and therefore the return on this investment is nil. Results from
column (2) suggest similar results than that in column (1) except for the direct
effect of economic freedom on dividends (α11) which is not significant.
2.6 Conclusion
The present research studies the impact of countries’ institutional quality on
firms’ performance and on demand for stocks. It also focuses on the effect of
institutional quality on firms resilience to systemic shocks. In the theoretical
model, we assume that systemic shocks reduce dividends for all firms in the
economy and that high institutional quality reduces the negative impact of
systemic shocks on dividends. Thus, under our assumptions, we show that
institutional quality raises the demand for stocks. Second, we build an empirical
model to test the two key assumptions of the theoretical model. We show that
our main hypotheses are verified and robust to various specifications. Moreover,
additional results suggest the existence of a persistence in dividends payout.
Therefore, firms that paid large dividends in the previous year are more likely
to distribute large dividends in the subsequent year.
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2.8 Appendix
Appendix A
We prove that the second order condition of problem (2.6) for a maximum is
verified.
The second order condition of (2.6) with respect to qk is:
− [φ(1−γ)2+ψ(N −2β)+β2ψ]< 0. (2.12)
Since N ≥ 2,β ∈ (0,1] and γ ∈ (0,1], (2.12) is always verified.
Appendix B
Here, we show that the residuals are well distributed around 0.
Figure 2.4 Residuals
Chapter 3
Regulation and Rational
Banking Bubbles in Infinite
Horizon
(joint with Claire Océane Chevallier)

Abstract
This chapter develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in infinite
horizon with a regulated banking sector where stochastic banking bubbles may
arise endogenously. We analyze the condition under which stochastic bubbles
exist and their impact on macroeconomic key variables. We show that when
banks face capital requirements based on Value-at-Risk, two different equilibria
emerge and can coexist: the bubbleless and the bubbly equilibria. Alternatively,
under a regulatory framework where capital requirements are based on credit
risk only, as in Basel I, bubbles are explosive and as a consequence cannot
exist. The stochastic bubbly equilibrium is characterized by positive or negative
bubbles depending on the tightness of capital requirements based on Value-at-
Risk. We find a maximum value of capital requirements under which bubbles
are positive. Below this threshold, the stochastic bubbly equilibrium provides
larger welfare than the bubbleless equilibrium. In particular, our results suggest
that a change in banking policies might lead to a crisis without external shocks.
Key words: Banking bubbles, banking regulation, DSGE, infinitely lived
agents, multiple equilibria, Value-at-Risk.
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3.1 Introduction
The Great Recession of 2007-2009 has highlighted the importance of the banking
sector in the worldwide economy and its role in the propagation of the crisis.
Valuation and liquidity problems in the U.S banking system are recognized to
be a cause of the crisis (Miao and Wang, 2015). In particular, Miao and Wang
(2015) argue that changes in agents’ beliefs about stock market value of banks
are suspected to explain sudden financial market crashes.
As a consequence, there has been a greater awareness among both academics
and policy makers about the failure of banking regulation in preventing crises.
The Basel committee on Banking Supervision was created in 1973 “to enhance
understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking
supervision worldwide”.1 They released the first Basel Accord, called “Basel
I” in 1988. The goal of Basel I was to create a framework for internationally
active banks, in particular seeking, to prevent international banks from growing
without adequate capital. Therefore, the committee imposed minimum capital
requirements which were calculated based on credit risk weights of loans.
Credit risk weights take into account possible losses on the asset side of a
bank’s balance sheet. The idea was that banks holding riskier assets had to
hold more capital than other banks in order to ensure solvency. This approach
has been criticized by researchers and regulatory agencies because it only
considers credit risk and does not encompass market risk.2 Market risk refers
to the risk of losses from changes in market prices, which increases banks’
default risk. The Basel committee has recognized this problem and released
the Basel II Capital Accord.3 This new accord also considers market values
into the banking regulation framework in order to take into account market
1For more details, see The Basel Committee overview, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/.
2For example, Dimson and Marsh (1995) analyze the relationship between economic risk
and capital requirements using trading book positions of UK securities firms. They find that
the Basel I approach leads only to modest correlation between capital requirements and total
risk.
3See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004).
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risk of the trading book. It allows banks to use an internal model based on
Value-at-Risk to quantify their minimum capital requirements. The idea of
capital requirements based on Value-at-Risk is to impose a solvency condition
for banks which requires that the maximum amount of debt that banks can
hold, do not exceed the market value of banks assets in the worst case scenario.4
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the impact of banking regulation and
in particular, Basel II, on the development of stochastic bubbles on banks’ stock
prices. A stochastic bubble on bank’s stock price is defined as a temporary
deviation of the bank’s stock price from the bank’s fundamental value. Figure
3.1 plots the price index of 168 banks listed in Europe from 1973 to 2016. It
shows that the price index has sharply increased from 2004, which coincides
with the release of Basel II. Therefore, we suspect that the Basel II regulatory
framework has allowed the existence of bubbles in the banking sector.
Figure 3.1 Banks price index
4Basel III, released in 2011, also proposes to use the Value-at-Risk to measure the
minimum capital requirement. The difference with Basel II is that it is amended to include a
Stressed-Value-at-Risk (SVaR). It aims at reducing pro-cyclicality of the market risk approach
and insures that banks hold enough capital to survive long periods of stress.
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This paper also focuses on the effect of bubbles on macroeconomic key
variables. Following Blanchard and Watson (1982) and Weil (1987), stochastic
bubbles are bubbles that have an exogenous constant probability of bursting.
Once they burst, they do not reemerge. We develop a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model with three types of infinitely lived agents, banks,
households, and firms, as well as a regulatory authority. Banks raise funds by
accumulating net worth and demanding deposits (supplied by households) to
provide loans to firms. Firms produce the consumption goods, invest and are
subject to productivity shocks. The regulatory authority imposes two banking
regulations. The first requires that banks keep a fraction of deposits as reserves.
These reserves cannot be used to invest in loans (risky assets). The second
measure requires banks to have an upper limit on the quantity of deposits
based on Value-at-Risk capital requirements.
We show that bubbles emerge if agents believe that they exist. Thus, ex-
pectations of agents are self-fulfilling. Results suggest that when banks face
capital requirements based on Value-at-Risk, two different equilibria emerge
and can coexist: the bubbleless and the stochastic bubbly equilibria. The
capital requirement based on Value-at-Risk allows bubbles to exist. In contrast,
under a regulatory framework where capital requirement is based on credit risk
only, as in Basel I, banking bubbles are explosive and as a consequence cannot
exist. The stochastic bubbly equilibrium before the bubble bursts is charac-
terized by positive or negative bubbles depending on the tightness of capital
requirements. A positive (resp. negative) bubble is a "persistent" overvaluation
(resp. undervaluation) of banking stock price. We find a maximum value of the
capital requirement based on Value-at-Risk under which bubbles are positive.
Below this value and until the bubble bursts, the stochastic bubbly equilibrium
provides larger welfare than the bubbleless equilibrium. The intuition is that,
when agents consider that a bubble exists, lower capital requirements lead
to optimistic beliefs about bank valuation. Bubbles allow banks to relax the
capital requirement constraint, and thus banks demand more deposits and
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make more loans. This effect reduces the lending rate and provides higher
welfare. Profits of banks rise which increases the value of banks. As a conse-
quence, initial beliefs about the value of banks are realized. In contrast, above
this maximum capital requirement, bubbles are negative leading to a credit
crunch and thus, reduce welfare. Therefore, our model shows that a change
in regulation might lead to a crisis, by shifting the economy from higher to
lower welfare. This can explain the existence of crises without external shocks.
We also show that the equilibrium with positive stochastic bubbles exists if
the probability that bubbles collapse is small. This is consistent with Weil
(1987) and Miao and Wang (2015). Moreover, as in Miao and Wang (2015),
our results suggest that after the bubble bursts, consumption, welfare, and
output fall. Consequently, a change in beliefs also modifies the equilibrium,
from higher to lower welfare. Finally, we simulate impulse response functions
to a negative productivity shock. The results show that bubbles do not amplify
the effect of a negative productivity shock on the economy.
This chapter is related to two strands of literature. First, it is related
to the literature on banking regulation. Indeed, there is a very recent move
towards macroeconomic models incorporating a banking sector (de Walque
et al., 2010; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2011; Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Gertler et al.,
2012; He and Krishnamurthy, 2012; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014). In
particular, we focus on banking regulation and their impact on macroeconomic
variables as in Dib (2010) and de Walque et al. (2010). As in Dangl and Lehar
(2004) and Tomura et al. (2014), we study the impact of Value-at-Risk banking
regulation on the economy. Dangl and Lehar (2004) compare the effect of
capital regulation based on Basel I and Value-at-Risk internal model approach.
They find that the latter regulation reduces risk in the economy. Tomura et al.
(2014) introduce asset illiquidity in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model and show that capital requirements based on Value-at-Risk can lead
banks to adopt macro-prudential behavior. We contribute to this literature
by showing that capital requirements based on Value-at-Risk allow bubbles to
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exist. In contrast, under a regulatory framework where capital requirements
are based on credit risk only, as in Basel I, bubbles are explosive and as a
consequence cannot exist.
Second, this chapter is related to the literature on the existence and the
effect of rational bubbles in infinite horizon and, in particular, on stochastic
bubbles. The literature on the existence of bubbles in general equilibrium
models with infinitely lived agents is scarce and marked with few important
contributions (Miao, 2014). Therefore, the understanding of financial bubbles
in infinite horizon models is still under explored. Tirole (1982) shows that
bubbles under rational expectations with infinitely lived agents cannot exist.
In addition, Blanchard and Watson (1982) argue that "the only reason to hold
an asset whose price is above its fundamental value is to resell it at some time
and to realize the expected capital gain. But if all agents intend to sell in
finite time, nobody will be holding the asset thereafter, and this cannot be an
equilibrium". Such behavior implies that agents over save so that they do not
consume everything they could. This cannot be an equilibrium since agents
would deviate to increase their consumption levels and, thus, the so called
transversality condition (TVC) is not satisfied. In contrast, Kocherlakota (1992)
demonstrates that bubbles may exist in an infinite horizon general equilibrium
model with borrowing or wealth constraints. These constraints limit the agent
arbitrage opportunities by introducing some portfolio constraints. Foremost,
Kocherlakota (2008) shows that equilibrium in which the asset price contains
a bubble can coexist with the bubbleless equilibrium in the presence of debt
constraints. The only difference between the two states (bubbles and no bubbles)
is that the bubbly one modifies the debt limit. The author calls this result the
“bubble equivalence theorem”. We contribute to this literature by showing that
banking bubbles may emerge with banking regulation based on Value-at-Risk
in an infinite horizon general equilibrium framework.
Our study is mostly related to Miao and Wang (2015). They insert an
endogenous borrowing constraint and show that bubbles can emerge in an
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infinitely lived general equilibrium framework without uncertainty. Bubbles
are introduced through the bank problem. We borrow the same methodol-
ogy to introduce bubbles. Nevertheless, our model contrasts with Miao and
Wang (2015) regarding four major characteristics. First, our key idea is to
introduce banking regulation in an infinitely lived agent model to analyze
whether stochastic bubbles can arise. Second, our model is a stochastic general
equilibrium, in contrast, Miao and Wang (2015) consider a deterministic model.
Third, negative bubbles as well as positive bubbles can arise, while they only
assume positive bubbles. Fourth, they consider an agency problem to justify a
minimum dividend policy that links dividends to net worth. Our model does
not impose a dividend policy.
The present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 and section 4 analyze, respectively, the bubbleless and the stochastic
bubbly general equilibrium. Section 5 compares both equilibria. Section 6
presents the calibration, explores local dynamics and compares impulse response
functions to a negative productivity shock for both equilibria. Finally, the last
section concludes.
3.2 Model
We consider an economy with three types of infinitely lived agents, banks,
households, and firms, as well as a regulatory authority. In this model, banking
bubbles can arise. They emerge only if agents believe that banks’ stock prices
contain a bubble. The bubble is, thus, self-fulfilling. Banks, households, and
firms are respectively represented by a continuum of identical agents of mass
one. Households are shareholders of banks and owners of firms. It is assumed
that banks have the necessary technology and knowledge to engage in lending
activity while households do not. Thus, the latter do not lend directly to non-
financial firms and have recourse to banks. At the end of each period, banks
raise funds internally, using net worth, and externally, by taking deposits from
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households. Using raised funds, they lend to firms which produce consumption
goods. In the model, a bubble is introduced through the bank problem, as in
Miao and Wang (2015). We consider a bubble with an exogenous probability
of burst, i.e., a stochastic bubble as in Blanchard and Watson (1982). Although
a bubble can only arise if agents believe in its existence, it is not an agent
choice. Agents are “bubble takers”. The optimization problem of each agent is
presented in this section.
3.2.1 Households
Households are represented by a continuum of identical agents of unit mass.
Each household starts with an initial endowment of stocks s0 and deposits D0.
At each period t, it receives net profits πt generated by firms, it chooses its
optimal consumption ct, the amount of stocks st+1, and deposits Dt+1 for the
next period. It also receives dividends dt from the shares st it owns, sells its
shares at price pt+1 and obtains an interest rate rt on the amount deposited
Dt in the previous period. There is no uncertainty on savings and thus rt
is the risk-free interest rate. We assume that preferences of households are
represented by a linear utility function in consumption. Given the budget
constraint (3.1), each household chooses the optimal amount of shares, deposits
and consumption {st+1,Dt+1, ct}∞t=0 that maximizes its expected lifetime linear
utility. Each household optimization problem is defined as follows:
Max{st+1,Dt+1,ct}∞t=0Et
∞∑
t=0
βtct,
subject to
Dt (1+ rt)+ st (pt+1+dt)+πt =Dt+1+ ct+ st+1pt+1, (3.1)
where β ∈]0,1[ is the discount factor and Et is the expectation operator.
The first order conditions with respect to Dt+1 and st+1, are given by
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βEt (1+ rt+1) = 1, (3.2)
pt+1 = βEt (dt+1+pt+2) . (3.3)
The combination of (3.2) and (3.3) gives the households no arbitrage condition,
Et (dt+1+pt+2)/pt+1 =Et (1+ rt+1). This last condition states that the return
on stocks is equal to the return on deposits. If it is met, households are
indifferent between both types of assets and both are held in the portfolio
of agents. However, if this condition is not satisfied, the optimal solution of
households yields to a corner solution, thus, only stocks or only deposits are
held, depending on which has the highest return.
Since the optimization problem has an infinite horizon, we also have to
consider the following transversality condition:
limt→∞βtptst = 0. (3.4)
Condition (3.4) ensures that the household spends all its budget and thus, does
not hold positive wealth when t→∞. It is a necessary condition for an optimum
choice of the household. Tirole (1982) shows that bubbles under rational
expectations with infinitely lived agents cannot exist since the transversality
cannot be satisfied. However, in our framework, banking bubbles satisfy this
condition and therefore, may exist.
3.2.2 Firms
Firms are represented by a continuum of identical producers of unit mass. Each
firm starts with an amount of loans L0 to buy its initial capital K0. Firms
are subject to productivity shocks. The shock process is defined by an AR(1)
process such that At = AzAt−1 exp(ut), where zA is a strictly positive persistence
and ut is a normally distributed productivity shock with mean 0 and variance
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σ2z . After the shock, in each period t, firms produce yt using capital bought in
the last period Kt and reimburse their loans with interests rlt such that the total
reimbursement is Lt
(
1+ rlt
)
. Then, they distribute net profits to households
and choose their optimal amount of total loans and capital for the next period
{Lt+1,Kt+1}∞t=0 to maximize their future expected discounted profits subject
to their budget constraint and the capital constraint. Note that we consider
capital that fully depreciates. Each firm optimization problem is defined as
follows:
Max{Lt+1,Kt+1}∞t=0Et
∞∑
t=0
βtπt,
subject to
πt = yt−Kt
(
1+ rlt
)
, (3.5)
yt = AtKtψ,
Kt+1 = Lt+1,
πt ≥ 0 and Lt,Kt > 0,
where ψ ∈]0,1[ is the output elasticity of capital. Using the Lagrange method,
the interior solution of the first order condition with respect to Lt+1 is given
by:
ψEt
(
At+1L
ψ−1
t+1
)
= Et
(
1+ rlt+1
)
. (3.6)
In the optimum, (3.6) shows that the marginal product of capital is equal to
the marginal cost of loans.
3.2.3 Banks
The banking sector is represented by a continuum of identical banks of unit
mass. To provide loans Lt+1 to firms, banks raise funds by accumulating net
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worth Nt+1 and demanding deposits Dt+1. The regulatory authority imposes
that banks keep a fraction φ ∈ [0,1[ of deposits as reserves5
Rt ≡ φDt. (3.7)
Each bank has a balance sheet composed of deposit Dt and net worth Nt on
the liability side and of loans Lt and reserves Rt on the asset side such that
Rt+Lt =Nt+Dt. (3.8)
Thus, at the end of each period t, each bank accumulates net worth using
profits from assets earned in t net of deposit repayments and dividends. Let rlt
be the lending rate earned in t and rt the risk-free interest rate paid in t, so
that
Nt+1 =
(
1+ rlt
)
Lt+Rt−Dt (1+ rt)−dt−Ct, (3.9)
where Ct = τNt represents operational costs paid by banks such as accounting
and legal fees and management costs. The parameter τ ∈]0,1] is the percentage
of operational costs over net worth. One can think about initial public offering
fees paid to a third party, for example to business attorney or business service
companies, to get listed on financial markets. Indeed, banks often use a third
party such as large business service companies (KPMG, Deloitte) to prepare
the legal and accounting side of public offerings. Specialized firms ensure that
regulatory and legal compliance are met.
Banks are also subject to capital requirements based on Value-at-Risk as
recommended by the Basel committee in Basel II.6 This regulation imposes that
banks hold a minimum of capital which is calculated with the aim of avoiding
banks becoming insolvent. The objective of the regulator is to preserve a safety
5Note that the reserve requirement φ is not crucial for the model nor for the bubble
existence. However, it is of interest as it allows the derivation of additional policy implications.
6See the BIS publication, the First Pillar Minimum Capital Requirements,
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm
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buffer, such that the market value of banks’ assets VAt is sufficient to repay
depositors. The market value of assets is given by
VAt = Vt (Nt)+Dt,
where Vt (Nt) is banks’ equity value. Therefore, the regulator imposes a solvency
condition which requires that the maximum amount of deposits banks can hold,
do not exceed the market value of banks assets in the worst case scenario such
that
Dt ≤ (1−µ)VAt,
where µ ∈ [0,1[ is a regulatory parameter which captures the loss in market
value of assets in the worst case scenario, as motivated by the Value-at-Risk
regulation. This regulation, based on market values, is the same as in Dangl
and Lehar (2004). The above equation is thus equivalent to
Dt ≤ ηVt (Nt) ,
where η= (1−µ)/µ> 0 is the Value-at-Risk regulation parameter. It represents
the maximum allowed leverage ratio in market value. We show in Appendix A
that without capital requirements, if
τβ (1−φ)> φ(1−β) , (3.10)
banks always hold the maximum amount of deposits. Indeed, when the marginal
benefit from holding deposits exceeds its marginal cost, banks always want more
deposits. From now on, we consider that (3.10) is always satisfied. Therefore,
the above constraint always binds and becomes
Dt = ηVt (Nt) . (3.11)
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For low values of η, the regulation is severe. Indeed, the amount of authorized
deposits that banks can hold compared to banks value is low. However, for
high η, the regulation is considered as lenient.
The aim of our framework is to model the existence of stochastic banking
bubbles as in Blanchard and Watson (1982), Weil (1987) and Miao and Wang
(2015). In period t, agents may believe in a bubble or not. If agents do not
believe a banking bubble exists in period t, a bubble can never emerge. In
what follows, first, we present the problem of banks when agents do not believe
a bubble exists. We then present the problem of banks when agents believe
that it exists. In this latter case, following Blanchard and Watson (1982), we
consider that the bubble may burst in the future with a probability ξ ∈]0,1[.
Note that once the bubble bursts, it never reappears.
Bubbleless path
At the end of period t, each bank chooses the optimal net worth {Nt+1} in
order to maximize its current dividends and expected present value of future
dividends subject to the reserve requirement (3.7), the balance sheet (3.8), the
budget constraint (3.9) and the capital requirement (3.11). If agents do not
believe a bubble exists, the value of the bank in period t is denoted V ∗t (Nt).
The bank problem can be summarized by the following Bellman equation
V ∗t (Nt) =Max{Nt+1}
{
dt+βEt
[
V ∗t+1 (Nt+1)
]}
,
subject to
dt =
(
1+ rlt
)
Nt+Dt
[
rlt(1−φ)− rt
]
− τNt−Nt+1,
Dt = ηV ∗t (Nt) ,
Nt,Dt ≥ 0 for all t.
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We show in Appendix B that the solution of the above maximization problem
gives us the following form for the value function:
V ∗t (Nt) = q∗tNt, (3.12)
where q∗t ≥ 0 is the marginal value of net worth. It can also be interpreted as
the Tobin Q (Tobin, 1969). Define the bank’s stock price in t+1 by
pt+1 = βEt
[
V ∗t+1 (Nt+1)
]
.
Proposition 1. When agents do not believe a bubble exists, the solution of
each bank maximization problem is given by the following system of equations.
Et
(
q∗t+1
)
= 1
β
, (3.13)
q∗t =
(
1+ rlt− τ
)
+ηq∗t
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]
. (3.14)
Proof of Proposition 1 is presented in Appendix B.
When agents do not believe a bubble exists, the expected marginal value of
net worth given by (3.13) is constant. This comes from the fact the bank is
risk-neutral. Thus, by increasing one unit of net worth today, the bank gets the
expected discounted marginal value of net worth. Equation (3.14) shows that
an additional marginal value of net worth today gives the discounted return
due to the increase in loans minus operational costs. It also allows the bank
to relax the constraint by taking η units of additional deposits (see equation
(3.11)). Then, the bank earns an additional return of
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]
. Using
(3.13) and (3.14), results show that the lending rate is also constant, which is
consistent with the risk neutrality assumption.
Bubbly path
When agents believe that a bubble exists in period t, the bank’s value V Bt (Nt)
contains a bubble bt ̸= 0. There exists a probability ξ ∈]0,1[ that the bubble
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bursts in t+1 such that bt+1 = 0 and thus, that the bank’s value becomes
VMt+1(Nt+1). Note that following Blanchard and Watson (1982), we assume that
once the bubble bursts, it never reappears. Figure 3.2 defines the bubble over
three periods:
Figure 3.2 Bubble definition
Therefore, the bank’s value can take two different possible values in t+1:
V Bt+1 (Nt+1) or VMt+1 (Nt+1), which occur, respectively, with a probability (1− ξ)
and ξ. The timeline of events can be summarized as follows.
Figure 3.3 Timeline of events
When a banking bubble exists in t, each bank chooses the optimal net worth
{Nt+1} in order to maximize its current dividends and expected present value
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of future dividends subject to the reserve requirement (3.7), the balance sheet
(3.8), the budget constraint (3.9) and capital requirements (3.11).
V Bt (Nt)=Max{Nt+1}
{
dt+βEt
[
V Bt+1 (Nt+1)
]
+ ξβEt
[
VMt+1 (Nt+1)−V Bt+1 (Nt+1)
]}
,
(3.15)
subject to
dt =
(
1+ rlt
)
Nt+Dt
[
rlt(1−φ)− rt
]
− τNt−Nt+1,
Dt = ηV Bt (Nt) ,
Nt,Dt ≥ 0 for all t,
where VMt+1 (Nt+1) is the value of the bank if the bubble bursts in t+1 and is
defined by V ∗t+1 (Nt+1) in the bubbleless equilibrium. Note that the difference
between VMt+1 (Nt+1) and V ∗t+1 (Nt+1) lies in their initial values of net worth.
The last term of (3.15) represents the change in values when the bubble bursts.
Indeed, when the bubble bursts with a probability of ξ, the banks value shifts
from V Bt+1 (Nt+1) to VMt+1 (Nt+1).
We show in Appendix C that the solution of the bank maximization problem
with a bubble gives us the following value function, until the bubble bursts:
V Bt (Nt) = qBt Nt+ bt, (3.16)
where qBt ≥ 0 is the marginal value of net worth and bt ̸= 0 is the bubble term
on the bank’s value. Variables qBt and bt are to be endogenously determined.
As it will become clear later, the bubble term is a self-fulfilling component that
can be increasing, decreasing or explosive. Note that (3.16) is the same as in
Miao et al. (2013). Define the stock price in t+1 when agents believe a bubble
exists and before the bubble bursts by
pt+1 = βEt
[
V Bt+1 (Nt+1)
]
+ ξβEt
[
VMt+1 (Nt+1)−V Bt+1 (Nt+1)
]
.
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Proposition 2. When agents believe a bubble exists in t, until the bubble bursts,
the solution of each bank maximization problem is given by the following system
of equations.
Et
(
qBt+1
)
=
1− ξβEt
(
qMt+1
)
β (1− ξ) , (3.17)
qBt =
(
1+ rlt− τ
)
+ηqBt
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]
, (3.18)
(1− ξ)βEt (bt+1) = bt
{
1−η
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]}
. (3.19)
From the regulation based on Value-at-Risk, the regulator forces the bank to
satisfy (3.11) such that if bt+1 = 0, the value of qMt+1 is given by
qMt+1 =
1
η
Dt+1
Nt+1
. (3.20)
Proof of Proposition 2 is presented in Appendix C.
Equation (3.17) shows that, by increasing one unit of net worth today, the
bank gets the expected discounted marginal value of net worth if the bubble
lasts plus the expected discounted marginal value of net worth if the bubble
bursts. The probability of a burst introduces a price distortion because it
changes intertemporal arbitrage conditions. An increase in the marginal value
of net worth if the bubble bursts, decreases the marginal value of net worth if
the bubble stays. Therefore, the bank’s incentive to accumulate net worth if
the bubble remains is reduced, and then, the bank distributes more dividends
compared with when bt = 0 for all t. Equation (3.18) has the same intuition
than in the case where bt = 0 for all t. However, here, the lending rate is
not constant anymore and is positively correlated with the marginal value of
net worth. The intuition is that the larger the lending rate is, the larger the
incentive for banks to accumulate net worth is.
Equation (3.19) exists if and only if agents believe in the bubble such
that bt ≠ 0. It represents the bubble growth rate. The intuition is that the
bubble allows the bank to relax the capital requirement constraint by raising
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the bank’s value and thus increases deposits. In particular, the bubble allows
to relax the capital requirement constraint while avoiding the operational
costs. By increasing additional units of deposits, the growth of the economy
becomes larger. Moreover, the larger the marginal gain from the bubble
η
[
rlt (1−φ)− rDt
]
is, the smaller the growth rate of the bubble is. Finally, the
bubble grows faster with ξ to compensate for the probability of bursting.
Proposition 3. If
{
1−η
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]}
/β (1− ξ)< 1/β, (3.21)
the transversality condition of the household is always satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 3 is presented in Appendix D.
Proposition 3 states that the transversality condition (TVC) is satisfied, i.e
bubbles are not ruled out, if the growth rate of the bubble does not exceed the
rate of time preference of households. The transversality condition insures that
individuals do not hold positive wealth when t→∞. An important point to
highlight here, is that without the capital requirement constraint the bubble
growth is given by Et (bt+1)/bt−1 = 1/ [β (1− ξ)]−1, which is ruled out by the
TVC. Therefore, the bubble cannot exist. It is also straightforward that under
regulation based on book values as in Basel I, instead of on market values such
that with the Value-at-Risk, bubbles cannot exist.7 In addition, the combination
of (3.17), (3.18) and (3.19) yield Et (bt+1)/bt− 1 =
(
1+ rlt− τ
)
/
(
1−βξqMt
)
.
Thus, the growth rate is larger than 1/β when τ = 0, which is ruled out by the
TVC. The intuition is that operational costs (τ > 0) reduce the growth rate of
net worth and then, by no arbitrage, the growth rate of the bubble. Therefore
the bubble is no longer explosive and is not ruled out. Analogously, Miao and
Wang (2015) reduce the growth of net worth by assuming a minimum dividend
policy as a function of net worth.
7The Basel ratio Tier 1 is based on book values and takes the following form: Nt = χDt
where χ > 0 is a regulation parameter.
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The bubble return can be written as follows:
bt
(
1
β
−1
)
= 1
β (1− ξ)
{
η
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]
− ξ
}
bt︸ ︷︷ ︸
dividend yield
+Et (bt+1)− bt.︸ ︷︷ ︸
capital gain
This equation shows that the return on the bubble is equal to a capital gain
Et (bt+1)− bt plus a dividend yield. The dividend yield in the infinite horizon
model guarantees that the transversality condition does not rule out the bubble.
By relaxing the capital requirement, the bubble allows banks to raise η more
units of deposits and earn a return
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]
on it.
3.3 Bubbleless general equilibrium
This section defines and analyzes the bubbleless general equilibrium where
variables are denoted x∗t .
Definition 2. A competitive general bubbleless equilibrium with bt = 0 for all
t, is defined as sequences of allocations, prices and the shock process
E*t =
{
d∗t ,N
∗
t+1,K
∗
t+1,L
∗
t+1,D
∗
t+1,π
∗
t ,y
∗
t , c
∗
t , s
∗
t+1,q
∗
t , rt, r
l∗
t ,p
∗
t ,At
}
∀t,
such that taking prices as given, all agents maximize their future expected
payoffs subject to their constraints and the transversality condition is satisfied.
Finally, the market for loans, deposits, and stocks (s∗t+1 = 1) clear.
The equilibrium consumption is given by the combination of the three
budget constraints (3.1), (3.5) and (3.9), such that
c∗t + τN∗t = y∗t −L∗t+1− (R∗t+1−R∗t ). (3.22)
Equation (3.22) is the condition on the goods market. The sum of households
and banks consumption c∗t +τN∗t is equal to output net of investment and varia-
tion in reserves. Households’ consumption decreases with the investment which
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is represented by the amount of loans, the reserve variation and operational
costs.
Bubbleless stationary equilibrium
Here, we analyze a stationary bubbleless equilibrium when variables are constant
over time such that E∗0 = ...= E∗t = E∗ for all t. The equilibrium deposit rate is
given by (3.2) such that r = 1β −1. The marginal value of net worth in (3.13) is
q∗ = 1β . From the regulation based on Value-at-Risk in (3.11) and the value
function (3.12), we have
D∗
N∗
= η
β
. (3.23)
From (3.14), the lending rate is,
rl∗ = r (η+β)+βτ
β+η (1−φ) . (3.24)
Proposition 4. The lending rate rl∗ in a bubbleless stationary equilibrium
increases with the reserves φ and operational costs τ . In contrast, it decreases
with the Value-at-Risk regulation parameter η.
Proof of Proposition 4 is presented in Appendix E. The intuition is that
larger operational costs and reserves reduce the supply of loans, and as a
consequence increase the lending rate. In contrast, a larger Value-at-Risk
regulation parameter η allows banks to raise money using cheaply acquired
funds, i.e deposits. This effect raises banks’ size and reduces the lending rate.
For more insights, we also look at the interest rate spread, which is given by
β
(
rl∗− r
)
= (1−β)η
β+η (1−φ)φ+
β2
β+η (1−φ)τ.
The above equation shows that the discounted interest rate spread increases
with operational costs τ and the fraction of reserves φ. For φ= 0, the interest
spread is only a function of operational costs. When there are no costs for the
bank such that φ= τ = 0, the lending rate falls to the safe rate r.
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The stationary level of loans is given by the first order condition (3.6)
so that L∗ =
[(
1+ rl∗
)
/ψ
]1/(ψ−1)
. From the balance sheet constraint (3.8)
and (3.23), N∗ = L∗/ [1+(1−φ)(η/β)]. Thus, the equilibrium consumption
is given by c∗ = (L∗)ψ−L∗− τL∗/ [1+(1−φ)(η/β)]. Denote W ∗ the welfare
in a bubbleless stationary equilibrium. Therefore, W ∗ = c∗. The Appendix F
shows that W ∗ and L∗ are decreasing in the lending rate rl∗.
3.4 Stochastic bubbly general equilibrium
This section defines and analyzes the stochastic bubbly general equilibrium
where variables before and after the bubble bursts at t= T are, respectively,
denoted xBt and xMt .
Definition 3. If a bubble exists in t such that bt ̸= 0, until the bubble bursts
in T , a competitive stochastic bubbly general equilibrium is defined as
EBt = {dBt ,NBt+1,KBt+1,LBt+1,DBt+1,πBt ,yBt , cBt , bt, sBt+1,qBt , qMBt , rt, rlBt ,pBt ,At} ∀t<
T, such that taking prices as given, all agents maximize their future expected
payoffs subject to their constraints and the transversality condition is satisfied.
Finally, the market for loans, deposits, and stocks (sBt+1 = 1) clear. At t= T ,
the bubble crashes such that bt = 0 ∀t ≥ T, a competitive stochastic bubbly
general equilibrium EMt is defined as E*t ∀t ≥ T with NMT = NBT , such that
taking prices as given, all agents maximize their future expected payoffs subject
to their constraints and the transversality condition is satisfied. Finally, the
market for loans, deposits, and stocks (sMt+1 = 1) clear.8
As in the bubbleless equilibrium, the condition on the goods market is given
by (3.22), where variables correspond to the ones from the stochastic bubbly
general equilibrium.
8Note that the bank marginal value of net worth qBt until the bubble bursts is a function
of the marginal marginal value of net worth after the bubble collapses qMt . Therefore, this
latter value is included in the equilibrium before the burst of the bubble and is called qMBt .
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For simplicity, as in Weil (1987) and Miao and Wang (2015), we study a
stochastic bubbly equilibrium with the following properties. The equilibrium is
constant until the bubble collapses at t= T , such that EB0 = ...= EBT−1 = EB
with b0 = ...= bT−1 = b ≠ 0. We call it a semi-stationary equilibrium. At t= T ,
the banking bubble collapses such that bT = 0 and the equilibrium is denoted
by EMT . Then, for all t > T , the equilibrium EMT converges to the bubbleless
stationary equilibrium E∗. Figure 3.4 shows the dynamic of the price when a
positive banking bubble exists and then bursts.
Figure 3.4 Stock price’s dynamic when the positive bubble bursts
At t = T , the bubble bursts such that bt = 0 and stays at this value for
all t≥ T . The price pBt for all t < T falls to pMT . Then, the bank maximizes
dividends and expected discounted future dividends such that the bubble is
over and will never reappear. Therefore, the price converges to p∗ for all t > T .
The semi-stationary equilibrium, i.e until the bubble bursts, is characterized
by the following values. As in the bubbleless stationary equilibrium, the deposit
rate is given by (3.2) r = 1β −1. The lending rate before the bubble collapses is
defined by (3.19) such that
rlB = r(β+η)+βξ(1−φ)η .
Proposition 5. In a semi-stationary bubbly equilibrium, the lending rate
increases with the reserves φ and the probability of burst ξ. In contrast, it
decreases with the Value-at-Risk regulation parameter η.
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Compared to the bubbleless lending rate given by (3.24), the lending rate is
independent of operational costs τ. This characteristic will be explained later.
The interest rate spread between the lending rate and the risk-free deposit
rate, until the bubble collapses, is
β
(
rlB− r
)
= 1−β(1−φ)φ+
β (1−β)
(1−φ)
1
η
+ β
2
(1−φ)
ξ
η
.
Therefore, the spread is a function of the bank’s costs. It is increasing with
a large probability of burst to compensate for the risk and with high fraction
of reserves φ. In contrast, it decreases with less stringent capital requirement,
which is represented by a high η. If ξ = φ= 0, then the interest rate spread is
is equal to β (1−β)/η, which is proportional to the tightness of the regulatory
constraint. In addition, operational costs τ have no effects on the spread.
The marginal value of net worth when the bubble lasts and when the bubble
collapses are, respectively, given by (3.17)
qB = 1−βξq
M
β(1− ξ) =
1− τ + rlB
β(1− ξ) , (3.25)
and
qMB = τ − r
lB
βξ
. (3.26)
From (3.20), the leverage ratio is
DB
NB
= ηqMB. (3.27)
From the first order condition of firms (3.6), we obtain the equilibrium quantity
of loans
LB =
[
1
ψ
(
1+ rlB
)] 1ψ−1
. (3.28)
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From (3.7), (3.8), (3.27) and (3.28), we get
NB = L
B
1+(1−φ)ηqMB .
It can be shown that NB is strictly positive if and only if qMB > 0 which is
equivalent to
τ > [r(β+η)+βξ]/(1−φ)η. (3.29)
Equation (3.29) is called the "‘non negative net worth condition"’. In what
follows, we consider that this condition always holds. From the regulation
(3.11) and the value function when the bubble exists (3.16), we get
b= D
B
η
− qBNB. (3.30)
Using (3.25), (3.27) and (3.30), the bubble term can be re-written as
b =
(
qMB− qB
)
NB
=
[
η (τ − ξ)(1−φ)− r (η+β)+βξ)
βξ(1− ξ)(1−φ)η
]
NB. (3.31)
The equation above shows that the bubble increases with large operational
costs. An increase in operational costs τ should, without bubble, raise the
lending rate. However, in the presence of a bubble, the increase in τ enlarges the
bubble, which relaxes the capital requirement constraint. Thus, loans supply
increases, canceling out the effect of τ on the lending rate. From (3.11) and (3.1),
the equilibrium consumption is cB =
(
LB
)
ψ−LB− τLB/
[
1+(1−φ)DB/NB
]
.
Finally, we define the bubbly semi-stationary welfare as WB = cB. Compared
to the bubbleless stationary equilibria, the welfare has the same form. However,
it depends now on the bubble. Indeed, the bubble modifies the value of lending
rate by affecting the capital requirement constraint and thus, the equilibrium
quantity of loans. In the next section, the stationary bubbleless and the
semi-stationary stochastic bubbly equilibrium will be compared.
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Using (3.31), the condition under which a semi-stationary stochastic bubbly
equilibrium exists can be written as ξ ̸= ξ¯, where
ξ¯ = η [(1−φ)τ − r]− (1−β)
β+η(1−φ) . (3.32)
Therefore, the semi-stationary stochastic bubbly equilibrium exists if the prob-
ability of burst is ξ ̸= ξ¯. It can be shown that a positive bubble exists for small
value of the probability of burst ξ < ξ¯. This is consistent with Weil (1987)
and Miao and Wang (2015) who also find that positive bubbles exist only
for small value of the bursting probability. Thus, suppose we have a positive
bubble, a change in beliefs concerning the probability of burst might modify the
equilibrium, from a positive semi-stationary bubbly equilibrium to a bubbleless
stationary equilibrium.
Figure 3.5 displays the bubble’s value in the parameter space (ξ,τ), for a
given η and φ. At ξ = ξ¯, the bubble term is zero. For ξ < ξ¯ (resp. ξ > ξ¯),
the bubble is positive (resp.negative). The slope of the line ξ¯ increases with
large values of the Value-at-Risk regulation parameter η. Thus, the parameter
space for the positive bubble widens. As the regulator becomes more lenient
such that η is high, the economy can enter a state in which bubbles are
positive, increasing welfare in the economy. As explained above, the space
where ξ > [τ (1−φ)η− r(β+η)]/β does not exist for NB > 0.
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Figure 3.5 Bubble’s value in the parameter space
Alternatively, we can also write the existence condition of a stochastic
semi-stationary bubbly equilibrium in terms of the regulation parameter based
on Value-at-Risk η such that η ̸= η¯, where
η¯ = 1−β(1− ξ)(τ − ξ)(1−φ)− r .
Proposition 6. Under (3.10), (3.21), (3.29) and η ̸= η¯, a stochastic semi-
stationary bubbly equilibrium exists (b ̸= 0). For η > η¯, the bubble is positive.
In contrast, for η < η¯, it is negative.
Proposition 8 suggests that the semi-stationary equilibrium with a stochastic
bubble exists if the regulation parameter based on Value-at-Risk is η ̸= η¯. Indeed,
under conditions described in Proposition 8, the transversality condition is
satisfied. As a result, a positive bubble exists only for large values of the
regulation parameter η. Thus, a reduction of the regulation parameter η might
modify the equilibrium, from the positive bubbly equilibrium to the bubbleless
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equilibrium. Another important policy implication, here, is that the reserve
requirement parameter φ affects negatively the threshold η¯. As a consequence,
when φ is large, the regulation parameter η should be even greater to be in the
positive bubbly semi-stationary equilibrium.
Figure 3.6 shows the dynamics of the positive stochastic bubbly equilibrium
for the marginal value of net worth qt, before and after the bubble bursts at
t= T . Suppose bt > 0 for all t < T .
Figure 3.6 Transition path when the positive bubble bursts
At t= T , the bubble bursts such that bt = 0 and stays at this value for all
t≥ T . Since deposits and net worth are pre-determined variables, the marginal
value of net worth qB goes straight to qMT . Thus, the value of the bank and
the price become, respectively, VMT (NBT ) and pMT . Then, the bank maximizes
dividends and expected discounted future dividends such that the bubble is
over and will never reappear. Therefore, the bank net worth converges from
NBT to the net worth value in the stationary bubbleless equilibrium N∗ on
the path NMt and the marginal value from qMt to the bubbleless stationary
equilibrium marginal value of net worth q∗. Thus, the price pMt converges to
p∗ for all t > T .
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3.5 Comparison of both equilibria
This section compares the stationary bubbleless and the stochastic semi-
stationary bubbly equilibria.
Proposition 7. If η ̸= η¯ both equilibria with and without a bubble on stock
prices coexist.
Proposition 8. If η > η¯, the bubbly equilibrium lending rate before that the
bubble collapses is lower than the bubbleless lending rate. Thus, welfare is larger
with a positive bubble. In contrast, a negative bubble (η < η¯) reduces welfare.
Proof of Proposition 8 is in Appendix G. Both stochastic bubbly and
bubbleless equilibria co-exist for all values of the Value-at-Risk regulation
parameter η except at the point η¯. This point can be viewed as a point
of reversal at which you may move from a positive bubbly equilibrium to a
negative bubbly stochastic semi-stationary equilibrium. At this reversal point,
the equilibrium can move from from higher to lower welfare. For η > η¯, the
capital requirement based on Value-at-Risk is less stringent. In that case, the
stochastic semi-stationary bubbly equilibrium provides larger welfare than the
bubbleless equilibrium. The intuition is that, when agents consider that the
bubble exists, a lower capital requirement leads to optimistic beliefs on banks
value. The bubble allows banks to relax the capital requirement constraint,
and thus banks demand more deposits, which raises their leverage, and make
more loans. This effect reduces the lending rate and provides better welfare. In
contrast, for more stringent capital requirement η < η¯, the bubble is negative
leading to a credit crunch and thus, reducing the welfare compared to the
bubbleless equilibrium. An important point to highlight here is that a change in
banking regulation may modify the equilibrium and leads to crises, by reducing
welfare levels. This effect can explain the occurrence of crises without any
external shocks. In addition, using (3.32), results also show that a change in
beliefs about the probability of burst may also lead to a crisis, as in Miao and
Wang (2015).
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The following table summarizes and compares the main results discussed in
this section.
Table 3.1 Policy implication
η > η¯ η<η¯
variables
b b>0 b<0
rl rlB < rl∗ rlB > rl∗
L LB>L∗ LB<L∗
D
N
DB
NB
> D
∗
N∗
DB
NB
<D
∗
N∗
W WB>W ∗ WB<W ∗
Table 3.1 shows that, when agents believe a bubble exists, a positive
bubble arises for lenient regulatory Value-at-Risk constraints, η > η¯. It leads
to a highest equilibrium welfare level, highest equilibrium quantity of loans
and leverage levels. On the opposite, a negative bubble arises when capital
requirement based on Value-at-Risk are more stringent. The negative bubbly
semi-stationary equilibrium is characterized by the lowest equilibrium level of
welfare, credit and leverage.
3.6 Local dynamics and simulations
The present section, first, presents the calibration. Second, it analyzes local
dynamics around the bubbleless stationary equilibrium and the semi-stationary
stochastic bubbly equilibrium. Finally, we simulate and compare a negative
productivity shock from both equilibria.
3.6.1 Calibration
Here, we calibrate the parameters and we report the implied values for variables
in the bubbleless stationary and bubbly semi-stationary equilibria. We present
a numerical example. We calibrate β = 0.99, the capital share of output
to ψ = 0.33, the probability of burst ξ = 0.1. The regulatory parameter is
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µ = 0.09, which implies that η = 10.11. This calibration for µ allows us to
have a tier 1 ratio around 8% as recommended by the Basel committee.9
This ratio is 8.99% for the bubbleless stationary equilibrium and 7.12% for
the semi-stationary stochastic bubbly equilibrium. The reserve parameter
φ = 0.01 is set as required by the European Central Bank.10 Finally, we set
operational costs to a proportion τ = 0.15 of net worth. Under these values
of parameters, Propositions 7 and 8 show that the bubbly and the bubbleless
stationary equilibria, until the bubble bursts coexist and that the stochastic
bubbly semi-stationary equilibria has a positive bubble (η > η¯). Moreover,
under this calibration, the marginal value of net worth in T , once the bubble
has burst is qMT = 1.3021.
Table 3.2 Bubbleless and bubbly equilibria
Bubbly > 0 Bubbleless
Variables
N 0.0132024 0.0166121
D 0.173818 0.169664
d 0.000171925 0.000167799
L 0.185282 0.184579
p 0.0170206 0.0166121
q 0.977657 1.0101
rl 0.0210922 0.0236939
b 0.00428355 0
W 0.386042 0.385514
Table 3.2 confirms results summarized in Table 3.1. Compared to the
bubbleless steady state, the quantity of loans supplied by banks is larger in the
stochastic bubbly semi-stationary equilibrium. This gives a relatively lower
lending rate rl, leading to a higher welfare W . prices.
9This ratio is defined as total net worth over risky assets.
10See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/mr/html/calc.en.html.
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3.6.2 Local dynamics
To analyze the stability and uniqueness properties of the system, we log-
linearize the system around the stationary and the semi-stationary equilibria.
This results in a system of stochastic linear difference equations under rational
expectations. When agents do not believe a bubble exists, bt = 0 for all t,
as well as when agents believe a bubble exists, bt > 0 for t= 0, ..T , until the
bubble bursts, the eigenvalues associated with the linearized system around,
respectively, the stationary bubbleless and the stochastic semi-stationary bubbly
equilibria, show that the number of unstable eigenvalues (eigenvalues that lie
outside the unit circle) is equal to the number of forward looking variables.11
Thus, under this calibration, the system of equations when bt = 0 for all t and
when bt > 0 for all t < T , is determined and both the bubbleless and the bubbly
equilibria are stable and unique. This implies that given an initial value of N∗t
in the neighborhood of the stationary bubbleless equilibrium, there exists a
unique value of q∗t such that the system of linear difference equations converges
to the unique stationary bubbleless equilibrium along a unique saddle path
(see Blanchard and Kahn, 1980). Similarly, given an initial value of NBt in
the neighborhood of the stochastic semi-stationary bubbly equilibrium, there
exists a unique value of qBt such that the system of linear difference equations
converges to the unique stochastic semi-stationary bubbly equilibrium along a
unique saddle path, for all t < T .
3.6.3 Simulations
As an illustration, Figure 3.7 displays the impulse response functions of a
1% negative productivity shock from the stationary bubbleless and the semi-
stationary positive stochastic bubbly equilibria until the bubble bursts (for all
t < T ). To that end, we calibrate the persistence of the productivity shock zA
to 0.95. This is standard in the real business cycle literature.
11Eigenvalues are reported in Appendix H.
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From the bubbleless stationary equilibrium, a negative productivity shock
decreases firms profits and thus also the demand for loans. By the balance
sheet, the reduction in assets leads to a fall in net worth accumulation, which
increases dividends (see equation (3.9)). Moreover, the fall in net worth reduces
the ability of banks to raise deposits. The reduction in loans leads to a decrease
in production and welfare. Since there is no uncertainty about the bank value,
the marginal value of net worth and the lending rate are constant. Finally, the
stock price falls following the decrease in net worth.
The impulse response functions from the semi-stationary stochastic bubbly
equilibrium are similar to the ones from the bubbleless equilibrium. The main
difference lies in the fact that the uncertainty on the burst of the bubble changes
the inter-temporal substitution between net worth and dividends. A negative
productivity shock that decreases loans demand and decreases net worth raises
the marginal value of net worth. Indeed, a fall of net worth below its steady
state value raises the incentive to increase net worth, reducing the value of
holding investment in the bubble, and thus the bubble growth diminishes.
Therefore, net worth from the bubbly equilibrium falls by less than from the
bubbleless equilibrium.
In conclusion, impulse response functions from both equilibria show that
the effect of a productivity shock are similar. This suggests that the bubble
does not amplify the effect of shocks on real economic variables.
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Figure 3.7 Negative productivity shock
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3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a stochastic general equilibrium model in infinite
horizon with a regulated banking sector where a stochastic banking bubble
may arise endogenously. We show that a bubble emerges if agents believe that
it exists. Thus, expectations of agents are self-fulfilling. Results suggest that
when banks face a capital requirement based on Value-at-Risk, two different
equilibria emerge and can coexist: the bubbleless and the bubbly equilibria.
The capital requirement based on Value-at-Risk allows the bubble to exist.
Alternatively, under a regulatory framework where the capital requirement is
based on credit risk only as specified in Basel I, a bubble is explosive and as a
consequence cannot exist. The stochastic bubbly equilibrium is characterized
by a positive or a negative bubble depending on the capital requirement based
on Value-at-Risk. We find a maximum capital requirement under which the
bubble is positive. Below this threshold, the stochastic bubbly equilibrium
provides larger welfare than the bubbleless equilibrium. Therefore, this result
suggests that a change in banking policies might lead to a crisis. This can
explain the existence of crisis without any external shocks. We also show
that a semi-stationary equilibrium with a positive (resp. negative) stochastic
bubble exists if the probability that the bubble collapses is small (resp. high).
Consequently, a change in beliefs about the bubble’s probability of burst also
modifies the equilibrium, from a higher to a lower welfare.
Our model can be extended by the addition of different elements. Risk
aversion of households and endogenous labor choice can be considered. However,
endogenous labor choice will complicate the model without changing our main
results. Risk aversion can be introduced by a quadratic utility function for
households and thus, the emergence of bubbles can be studied in this context.
One can also add a probability of default on loans repayments in order to
model credit risk in the economy and analyze its impact on key macroeconomic
variables.
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Appendix A
Here, we show that without capital requirement, each bank chooses to hold the
maximum amount of deposits.
Each bank maximization problem without capital requirement is given by
Vt (Nt,Dt) =Max{Nt+1,Dt+1} [dt+βEtVt+1(Nt+1,Dt+1)] ,
subject to
dt =
(
1+ rlt
)
Nt+Dt
[
rlt(1−φ)− rt
]
− τNt−Nt+1,
Nt,Dt ≥ 0 for all t.
From the problem described above, we get
Vt(Nt,Dt) =
Max{Nt+1,Dt+1} (1+ r
l
t
)
Nt+Dt
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]
− τNt
−Nt+1+βEtVt+1(Nt+1,Dt+1).
The marginal value from an increase in net worth and deposits are given by
∂Vt (Nt,Dt)
∂Nt+1
=−1+βEt∂Vt+1(Nt+1,Dt+1)
∂Nt+1
, (3.33)
and
∂Vt (Nt,Dt)
∂Dt+1
= βEt
∂Vt+1(Nt+1,Dt+1)
∂Dt+1
.
Using the envelop theorem, we get
∂Vt (Nt,Dt)
∂Nt
= 1+ rlt− τ,
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and
∂Vt (Nt,Dt)
∂Dt
= rlt (1−φ)− rt.
Banks decide to hold an infinite amount of deposits if ∂Vt (Nt,Dt)/∂Dt+1 > 0,
which is equivalent to
rlt (1−φ)− rt > 0. (3.34)
The interior solution for the net worth is given by ∂Vt (Nt,Dt)/∂Nt+1 = 0.
Equation (3.33) becomes
1+ rlt− τ =
1
β
. (3.35)
From equation (3.35), we get the following lending rate
rlt =
1
β
−1+ τ.
Putting (3.33) in (3.34), we get the following condition
τβ (1−φ)> φ(1−β) .
If the above condition holds, banks always choose the maximum amount of
deposits, and consequently the capital requirement regulation always binds.
Appendix B
This appendix presents the proof of Proposition 1. From the bank bubbleless
maximization problem, we have
V ∗t (Nt) =Max{Nt+1}
{
dt+βEt
[
V ∗t+1 (Nt+1)
]}
,
subject to
dt =
(
1+ rlt
)
Nt+Dt
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]
− τNt−Nt+1,
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Dt = ηV ∗t (Nt) ,
Nt,Dt ≥ 0 for all t.
The Bellman equation becomes
V ∗t (Nt) =Max{Nt+1}
(
1+ rlt− τ
)
Nt+ηVt (Nt)
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]
−Nt+1+βEt
[
V ∗t+1 (Nt+1)
]
.
The marginal value from a net worth increase is given by
Et
[
∂V ∗t (Nt)
∂Nt+1
]
=−1+βEt
[
∂V ∗t+1 (Nt+1)
∂Nt+1
]
.
By the envelop theorem,
∂V ∗t (Nt)
∂Nt
=
(
1+ rlt− τ
)
+η∂V
∗
t (Nt)
∂Nt
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]
.
The interior solution for the net worth is given by ∂Vt (Nt)/∂Nt+1 = 0. There-
fore,
Et
[
∂V ∗t+1 (Nt+1)
∂Nt+1
]
= 1
β
.
Since the problem is linear in N , we get
V ∗t (Nt) = q∗tNt. (3.36)
Replacing (3.36) in the maximization problem, the solution is given by the
following system:
Et
(
q∗t+1
)
= 1
β
,
qt =
(
1+ rlt− τ
)
+ηqt
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]
.
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Appendix C
This appendix proves Proposition 2. From the bank maximization problem
when agents believe in a bubble such that bt ̸= 0, we have
V Bt (Nt)=Max{Nt+1}
{
dt+βEt
[
V Bt+1 (Nt+1)
]
+ ξβ
{
Et
[
VMt+1 (Nt+1)
]
−Et
[
V Bt+1 (Nt+1)
]}}
,
subject to
dt =
(
1+ rlt
)
Nt+Dt
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]
− τNt−Nt+1,
Dt = ηV Bt (Nt) ,
Nt,Dt ≥ 0 for all t,
where VMt+1(Nt+1) is the value of the bank if the bubble bursts in t+1 and is
defined as V ∗t+1 (Nt+1) for the bubbleless maximization problem.
The Bellman equation becomes
V Bt (Nt) =Max{Nt+1}
(
1+ rlt− τ
)
Nt+ηVt (Nt)
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]
−Nt+1
+βEt
[
V Bt+1 (Nt+1)
]
+ ξβEt
[
VMt+1 (Nt+1)−V Bt+1 (Nt+1)
]
.
The marginal value from a net worth increase is given by
Et
[
∂V Bt (Nt)
∂Nt+1
]
=−1+βEt
[
∂V Bt+1 (Nt+1)
∂Nt+1
]
+ ξβEt
[
∂VMt+1 (Nt+1)
∂Nt+1
− ∂V
B
t+1 (Nt+1)
∂Nt+1
]
.
By the envelop theorem,
∂V Bt (Nt)
∂Nt
=
(
1+ rlt− τ
)
+η∂V
B
t (Nt)
∂Nt
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]
.
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The interior solution for the net worth is given by ∂V Bt (Nt)/∂Nt+1 = 0. There-
fore,
Et
[
∂V Bt+1 (Nt+1)
∂Nt+1
]
=
1− ξβEt
[
∂VMt+1(Nt+1)
∂Nt+1
]
(1− ξ)β .
Since the problem is linear in N , we get
V Bt (Nt) = qBt Nt+ bt. (3.37)
Replacing (3.37) in the maximization problem, the solution is given by the
following system:
Et
(
qBt+1
)
=
1− ξβEt
(
qMt+1
)
β (1− ξ) ,
qBt =
(
1+ rlt− τ
)
+ηqBt
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]
,
(1− ξ)βEt (bt+1) = bt
{
1−η
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]}
.
Appendix D
This appendix presents the proof of Proposition 3. We show the condition to
ensure that the stochastic bubbly equilibrium until the bubble bursts satisfies
the transversality condition. The following transversality condition is required:
limt→∞ptβt = limt→∞Et−1
[
ξ
(
qMt Nt
)
+(1− ξ)
(
qBt Nt+ bt
)]
βt = 0.
It is satisfied if
limt→∞Et−1
[
ξ
(
qMt Nt
)
+(1− ξ)NtqBt
]
βt = limt→∞Et−1 (1− ξ)btβt = 0.
Since the bubble growth rate is
Et (bt+1)
bt
= 1
β (1− ξ)
{
1−η
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]}
,
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the TVC requires that
1
β (1− ξ)
{
1−η
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]}
<
1
β
.
Thus, the condition to allow a bubble to exist is
η
[
rlt (1−φ)− rt
]
> ξ.
Appendix E
This appendix proves Proposition 4. Here, we prove that the interest rate of
loans in the bubbleless stationary equilibrium is negatively correlated with the
Value-at-Risk regulation parameter η. Using (3.24), we have that
rl∗ = r (η+β)+βτ
β+η (1−φ) .
Therefore,
∂rl∗
∂η
= (1−β)− [1−β (1− τ)] (1−φ)
[β+η (1−φ)]2 < 0.
The numerator is negative if and only if τβ(1−φ)> φ(1−β), which is always
satisfied (see Appendix A).
Appendix F
The stationary bubbleless steady state welfare is given by the consumption
such that
W = Lψ−
(
1+ τ
1+(1−φ)DN
)
L.
Therefore, the marginal impact of the lending rate on welfare is
dW
drl
= ψ dL
drl
Lψ−1− dL
drl
(
1+ τ
1+(1−φ)DN
)
.
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Thus, dW
drl
< 0 if and only
ψLψ−1 <
(
1+ τ
1+(1−φ)DN
)
.
Since L=
[
(1+ rl)/ψ
] 1
ψ−1 , we have that
rl >
τ
1+(1−φ) DN
. (3.38)
In the stationary bubbleless equilibrium, the lending rate is rl∗ = r(η+β)+βτβ+η(1−φ) .
Therefore the condition (3.38) becomes
rl∗ = r (η+β)+βτ
β+η (1−φ) >
τ
β+(1−φ)η .
It is equivalent to
r (η+β)> 0,
which is always verified.
Appendix G
Here, we display the proof of Proposition 8
rlB− rl∗ = rη+1−β(1− ξ)
η(1−φ) −
1−β (1− τ)+ηr
β+η (1−φ) > 0.
Therefore, rlB− rl∗ > 0 if
η <
1−β(1− ξ)
(τ − ξ)(1−φ)− r = η¯.
Therefore, the bubbly lending rate is higher than then bubbleless lending rate if
and only if a negative bubble exists. For a positive bubble, we have rlB−rl∗ < 0.
Therefore, it can be shown that the welfare is higher in the presence of a
positive bubble. In contrast, it is lower with a negative bubble.
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Appendix H
Table 3.3 displays eigenvalues associated with the linearized system around the
stationary bubbleless and the semi-stationary bubbly equilibrium.
Table 3.3 Eigenvalue of the bubbly and bubbleless equilibria
bubbly (bt > 0) bubbleless (bt = 0)
values values
0 0
0 2.236e-55
0 3.012e-36
0 3.452e-36
1.456e-19 4.408e-19
9.661e-18 1.321e-17
9.161e-17 1.472e-17
0.95 0.95
1.01 1.01
1.038 1.915e+39
Inf Inf
Inf Inf
Inf
